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FORMALIZING THE INFORMAL:  
DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IMPACTS ON TRADITIONAL  







Bhutan is a small landlocked country with less than a million 
inhabitants, wedged between the two most populous nations on earth, India 
and China.1 It is known for its stunning Himalayan mountain ranges and its 
national development philosophy of pursuing “Gross National Happiness” 
(GNH).2 This paper argues, however, that Bhutan should also be known for 
its rich heritage of traditional dispute resolution. That system kept the peace 
in Bhutanese villages for centuries: the product of Bhutan’s unique history 
and its deep (primarily Buddhist) spiritual heritage.  
Sadly, these traditions are today at risk of extinction, victims—it is 
argued below—of Bhutan’s extraordinary process of modernization. This 
paper describes and contextualizes Bhutan’s traditional dispute resolution 
 
*  Stephan Sonnenberg is Associate Professor at Seoul National University School of Law in 
South Korea. From 2015 to 2020, he served as Associate Dean of Experiential Education and Clinics at 
the Jigme Singye Wangchuck School of Law (JSW Law), Bhutan’s first and only law school. My 
position at JSW Law gave me the opportunity to serve as one of two principal investigators running a 
research project on the nature of justice in Bhutan, from which this paper draws its findings. I would 
like warmly to thank and acknowledge the tremendous contributions of the rest of the research team, in 
particular Ms. Kristen DeRemer, Mr. Ugyen Thinley, Ms. Rinchen Dema, and Ms. Kuenzang Dolma, 
as well as countless other colleagues and counterparts in other agencies who provided crucial support to 
this research project. The study was generously supported by the Royal Government of Bhutan and the 
Ford Foundation, without which support none of this research could have been possible. I must also 
thank JSW Law’s Honorable President, its Governing Council, and its Dean for the trust they placed in 
our research team to conduct this study. Finally, I want to acknowledge and warmly thank my co-
Principal Investigator Ms. Kristen DeRemer and the entire editorial team at the Washington University 
Journal of Law and Policy for their substantive contributions and comments on previous drafts of this 
paper. These various contributions have contributed in innumerable ways to my own understanding of—
and abiding appreciation for—Bhutanese dispute resolution traditions. 
1.  See Bhutan Country Profile, BBC (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-
asia-12480707 [https://perma.cc/DEU8-ZPJV]. 
2.  See Ritu Verma, Gross National Happiness: Meaning, Measure and Degrowth in a Living 
Development Alternative, 24 J. POL. ECOLOGY 476 (2016). 








144            Washington University Journal of Law and Policy        [Vol. 63 
 
practices, and describes how they atrophied as a result of Bhutan’s 
investments into its formal justice system. What remains of Bhutan’s 
traditional dispute resolution system is today being completely replaced by 
the introduction of a formalized “modern” dispute resolution process. This 
modern model of community dispute resolution is often described as a 
revival and continuation of Bhutan’s traditional heritage of dispute 
resolution, but in fact it is something quite new. This paper explores the 
interplay between reforms to the formal justice system and informal dispute 
resolution practices in Bhutanese villages. It concludes by raising crucial 
ethical questions about development initiatives aimed at promoting the rule 
of law, especially regarding their impact on informal, or so-called 
“alternative,” dispute resolution processes in pluralistic legal systems.  
 
I. THE BHUTAN LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
 
This paper draws on research conducted between 2018 and 2020 into 
the nature of justice—broadly defined—in Bhutan.3 The Jigme Singye 
Wangchuck School of Law (JSW Law), Bhutan’s first and only law school, 
carried out this groundbreaking4 study as one of its first major research 
 
3.  See STEPHAN SONNENBERG, KRISTEN DEREMER, UGYEN THINLEY & RINCHEN DEMA, 
JIGME SINGYE WANGCHUCK SCH. OF LAW RESEARCH CTR., BHUTAN LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
(forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter LNA FINAL REPORT] (on file with author). A draft of the LNA Final 
Report was produced for purposes of informal consultations in February 2020, intended to generate input 
and feedback from key stakeholders. These consultations will ultimately feed into the final report for the 
LNA, which will be published in November 2020 as part of JSW Law’s Research Centre Publishing 
Series. All page numbers in references to the LNA Final Report are likely to be different in the final 
published version.  
4.  While this research is novel in many ways, it also builds on and contributes to foundations 
already laid by others, notably the former Chief Justice of Bhutan, Lyonpo Sonam Tobgye, see LYONPO 
SONAM TOBGYE, THE CONSTITUTION OF BHUTAN: PRINCIPLES AND PHILOSOPHIES (Royal Court of 
Justice 2015); Dasho Lungten Dubgyur, who currently sits as a Judge at Bhutan’s High Court, see 
LUNGTEN DUBGYUR, THE PARASOL OF THE SILKEN KNOT (Royal Court of Justice 2005) [hereinafter 
LUNGTEN DUBGYUR, PARASOL]; LUNGTEN DUBGYUR, THE WHEEL OF LAWS (Royal Court of Justice 
2015); and Dasho Lobzang Rinzin Yargay, the Director of the Bhutan National Legal Institute, see 
Lobzang Rinzin Yargay, The Mediation in Bhutan: “Saving Faces” and “Raising Heads”, 4 BHUTAN 
L. REV. 17 (2015); Lobzang Rinzin Yargay & Sangay Chedup, The Court-Annexed Mediation: 
Enhancing Access to Justice through In-House Court Mediation Services in Bhutan, 10 BHUTAN L. REV. 
92 (2018). Numerous non-Bhutanese scholars have also made significant contributions to the relevant 
literature on the nature, history, and mechanics of justice in Bhutan, notably Richard W. Whitecross, 
who conducted important ethnographic research in the early 2000s, before Bhutan’s transition to 
democracy. See Richard Whitecross, Of Texts and Drama: Delivering Justice in Bhutan, 2 BUDDHISM, 













projects. I5 was hired in 2015 to join a small and multinational cadre of 
specialists tasked with laying the intellectual foundation for that new law 
school. As part of those efforts, and in keeping with our institutional 
mandate to teach the law in a way that reflects both universal as well as local 
understandings of justice, I worked with colleagues to propose a nationwide 
“Legal Needs Assessment” (LNA) to inform our teaching before the arrival 
of our first batch of students.  
Convincing stakeholders that our research could be at once 
methodologically sound, rigorous, open-ended, and truly welcoming of 
non-western understandings of justice6 was no easy task. It required difficult 
conversations with those who hoped for a more simplistic approach. The 
study is not, as some donors had initially hoped, a naming-and-shaming 
 
“Virtuous Beings”: The Concept of Tha Damtshig, and Being a Moral Person in Contemporary 
Bhutanese Society, 28 HIMALAYA 71 (2008) [hereinafter Whitecross, Virtuous Beings]; Richard 
Whitecross, Transgressing the Law: Karma, Theft and its Punishment, 13 Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 
45 (2008) [hereinafter Whitecross, Transgressing the Law]; Richard Whitecross, The Thrimzhung 
Chenmo and the Emergence of the Contemporary Bhutanese Legal System, in THE SPIDER AND THE 
PIGLET: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST SEMINAR ON BHUTAN STUDIES 355-78 (Centre for Bhutan Studies 
2004) [hereinafter Whitecross, Thrimzhung Chenmo]; Richard Whitecross, The Zhabdrung's Legacy: 
State Transformation, Law and Social Values in contemporary Bhutan (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
at the University of Edinburgh). Other important non-Bhutanese scholars include Michael Aris, see 
MICHAEL ARIS, BHUTAN: THE EARLY HISTORY OF A HIMALAYAN KINGDOM (1979); Alessandro 
Simoni, see Alessandro Simoni, A Language for Rules, Another for Symbols: Linguistic Pluralism and 
Interpretation of Statutes in the Kingdom of Bhutan, 8 J. BHUTAN STUDIES 29 (2003); Alessandro Simoni 
& Richard Whitecross, Gross National Happiness and the Heavenly Stream of Justice: Modernization 
and Dispute Resolution in the Kingdom of Bhutan, 55 AM. J. COMP.L. 165 (2007); James Duffy, see 
James Duffy, Nangkha Nangdrik in the Land of the Thunder Dragon: Psychology, Religion and the 
Potential of Mediation in the Kingdom of Bhutan, 7 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 319 (2012) [hereinafter Duffy, 
Nangkha Nangdrik]; and Michaela Windischgraetz, see MICHAELA WINDISCHGRAETZ & RINZIN 
WANGDI, THE BLACK SLATE EDICT OF PUNAKHA DZONG  (2019). 
5.  For purposes of making this article easier to read, and also to underscore that from this point 
forward the views in this article are mine alone, I will from this point forward write in the first person. 
Any inaccuracies, misrepresentations, or oversimplifications, are mine alone. 
6.  Among anthropologists, there is a longstanding debate whether—and if so how—outsiders 
can ethically describe how a society works without inherently distorting it with their own cultural biases. 
For some, the very idea of a “post-colonial” ethnographic research effort is “a most pernicious fiction.” 
See RADHIKA VIRURU & GAILE CANELLA, POSTCOLONIAL ETHNOGRAPHY, YOUNG CHILDREN, AND 
VOICE, IN EMBRACING IDENTITIES IN EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION: DIVERSITY AND POSSIBILITIES 
158, Susan Grieshaber & Gaile Cannella eds., 2001 (suggesting that only local voices should be the ones 
empowered to speak for themselves). Others take solace in a “fervid defense of the particular, the local, 
and the parochial against the onslaught of ‘the global.’” Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, Ethnography 
on an Awkward Scale: Postcolonial Anthropology and the Violence of Abstraction, 4 ETHNOGRAPHY 
147, 154 (2003). Our research, similarly to that described by Comaroff and Comaroff, derives meaning 
from local interpretations of phenomena but also seeks to embrace potential global influences in the 
development of those localized meanings.  
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human rights report detailing a litany of alleged shortcomings of Bhutan’s 
justice sector.7 Nor is it a work of strict legal anthropology.8 Nor is our study 
a policy document presenting evidence structured to justify a proposed 
policy solution to a problem. Instead, it is a mix of all of the above, designed 
to document broad understandings of the concept of justice in contemporary 
Bhutan, and to situate those understandings in the context of a rapidly 
changing (developing) Bhutan. Most importantly, the study is designed to 
appeal to academics and policymakers alike. It presents findings, based on 
a sound methodology, that can also serve the needs of policymakers seeking 
input into their own efforts to strengthen Bhutan’s justice sector. 
 
A. LNA Focus 
 
The original mandate of the study—namely to feed our teaching at JSW 
Law—received an important reinforcement in 2016, when Bhutan’s 
policymakers decided, for the first time ever, to coordinate development 
planning across the entire justice sector.9 Previous development plans in 
Bhutan had never treated the justice sector as a coherent unit requiring a 
coordinated planning process. In anticipation of its inclusion into the 
national planning process, the various institutions comprising that sector 
assembled to think about how to strengthen the capacity of the justice sector 
as an integrated process. To monitor the success of those various capacity 
building initiatives, they realized that they first ought to come to a consensus 
about what is meant by the term “justice” in Bhutan.  
As a result of Bhutan’s unique history, political trajectory, and social 
dynamics, Bhutanese policymakers have a proud tradition of coining their 
 
7.  Irreconcilable misunderstandings on this point required us to return originally committed 
donor funds to avoid a fundamental incompatibility between the research objectives and donor 
expectations.  
8.  Cf. REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF 
BUDDHIST TIBET (1995). 
9.  Bhutan, just like its neighbor India (from which it inherited much of its bureaucratic 
machinery), plans its developmental activities according to five-year plans (FYPs). All government 
agencies, regional governments, and non-governmental recipients of government funds are expected to 
synchronize their institutional planning processes with the overall national planning priorities. The 
current FYP—Bhutan’s twelfth—spans the years from 2018-2023, and—for the first time ever—defines 















own political theory, rather than simply adopting so-called “global” 
concepts. The concept of development, for example, is famously interpreted 
differently in Bhutan than in other countries, drawing inspiration not from 
the dogma of international development institutions at the time, but rather 
from Buddhist concepts. These normative foundations famously resulted in 
Bhutan’s pursuit of a development policy designed to maximize GNH rather 
than gross national product.10 In 2016, the assembled justice sector 
stakeholders felt that the Bhutanese understanding of what constitutes 
justice might also be different in subtle but important ways from 
contemporary global standards—for example those articulated in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (the so-called “SDGs”).11 This 
conclusion necessitates important alterations to the purportedly global 
approach to rule-of-law capacity-building efforts in Bhutan.12  
While there was great enthusiasm and almost universal agreement that 
there might be such differences, no one in the room at the time was well 
equipped to elaborate on precisely where those differences might lie. 
Almost all of the key actors in the justice sector were formally educated—
usually abroad—and knew as much or more about foreign legal systems 
than they did about the Bhutanese system.13 The desire of the policymakers 
to use an authentically Bhutanese standard to evaluate the successes and 
failures of their justice-sector capacity-building efforts dovetailed perfectly 
 
10.  See Verma, supra note 2; see also KARMA URA, SABINA ALKIRE, TSHOKI ZANGMO & 
KARMA WANGDI, AN EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS OF GNH INDEX (2012); ROSS MCDONALD, TAKING 
HAPPINESS SERIOUSLY: ELEVEN DIALOGUES ON GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS (2010); Stephan 
Sonnenberg & Dema Lham, But Seriously Now . . . Lawyers as Agents of Happiness? The Role of the 
Law, Lawmakers, and Lawyers in the Realization of Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness, 45 F. FOR 
DEV. STUD. 461, 461–83 (2018); Julie McCarthy, The Birthplace Of “Gross National Happiness' Is 
Growing A Bit Cynical”, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/02/12/584481047/the-birthplace-of-gross-national-
happiness-is-growing-a-bit-cynical [https://perma.cc/7XXJ-XF4M]. 
11.  JIGME SINGYE WANGCHUCK SCH. OF LAW, JUSTICE SECTOR PLANNING: A CONTRIBUTION 
BY THE JUSTICE SECTOR TO THE GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS COMMISSION IN PREPARATION FOR THE 
12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2018-2023) (2016). 
12.  The approach of embracing global standards in measuring progress with regard to the rule 
of law, while also adding important national priority areas is consistent with the approach recommended 
by a high-level group of statisticians laying the groundwork for the development of a global set of 
indicators to assess progress with regard to the sixteenth goal of the Sustainable Development Goals 
pertaining to peace, justice and strong institutions. See GARY MILANTE, SUYOUN JANG, HYUNJUNG 
PARK AND KYUNGNAM RYU, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, GOAL 16 – THE INDICATORS WE WANT: VIRTUAL 
NETWORK SOURCEBOOK ON MEASURING PEACE, JUSTICE AND EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS.  
13.  See BHUTAN NAT’L LEGAL INST., PROFILE OF THE JUDGES (2019). 
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with JSW Law’s interest in answering that same question for its curricular 
needs. After further deliberation, Bhutan’s development planning 
commission (GNHC) officially mandated JSW Law to conduct the LNA as 
part of the overall national justice sector development plan for the period 
lasting from 2018-2023.14 This effort was intended eventually to generate 
an “authentically Bhutanese” and quantitative national justice-sector 
monitoring and evaluation strategy, incorporating not only global indicators 
generated by the United Nations Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG 
Indicators (IAEG-SDGs)15 to measure progress with regard to the targets set 
forth in the SDGs,16 but also national-level targets generated from the LNA 
and other national-level consultations.17  
 
14.  Bhutan’s 12th Five Year Plan (“12th FYP”) contains as one of its national key result areas 
the goal that “Justice Services and Institutions [be] Strengthened.” GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS 
COMMISSION, TWELFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 2018-2023, at 18 (2017), https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/gnh.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCE6-F54R]. The Justice sector’s strategic plan, 
which lays out the justice sector’s plan for achieving the objectives listed in in the 12th FYP contains as 
one of its goals carrying out “research to enhance understanding of justice issues in Bhutan and inform 
sectoral planning and decision-making.” See JUSTICE SECTOR STRATEGIC PLAN 6 (2018), 
https://www.acc.org.bt/sites/default/files/Justice%20Sector%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/85T2-ABZ7]. The implementation strategy document corresponding to this strategic 
plan lists nine separate areas where JSW Law’s LNA will provide development planners with crucial 
baseline data to guide and inspire further investments designed to strengthen Bhutan’s justice sector. See 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUSTICE SECTOR STRATEGIC PLAN BHUTAN (2019-2023), at A1-A9 (2019) 
(on file with author). 
15.  See Paul Pacheco & Ze Yar Min, Indicators’ Page, E-HANDBOOK ON SUSTAINABLE GOALS 
(Dec. 13, 2019), https://unstats.un.org/wiki/display/SDGeHandbook/Home [https://perma.cc/X6ZH-
KGUH], which lists an evolving list of global indicators associated with efforts to measure progress 
towards the SDGs. The website is put together by the United Nations Statistics Division in collaboration 
with relevant substantive agencies. These indicators, once finalized, are to be used by all U.N. member 
states to report on progress towards achieving the SDGs.  
16.  See Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. GOALS KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld [https://perma.cc/HVH3-
YRWK]. For a more detailed description of SDG16 and other SDGs relating to the justice sector more 
broadly, see also GLOB. ALL. FOR REPORTING PROGRESS ON PEACEFUL, JUST & INCLUSIVE SOC’YS, 
ENABLING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2030 AGENDA THROUGH SDG 16+: ANCHORING PEACE, 
JUSTICE AND INCLUSION (2019), https://www.sdg16hub.org/system/files/2019-
07/Global%20Alliance%2C%20SDG%2016%2B%20Global%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC5P-
6JVF]. 
17.  This methodology was in keeping with the clear recommendation by the expert panel of 
statisticians tasked with proposing a baseline set of global indicators to measure progress with regard to 
SDG-16  
that indicator identification is an iterative and consultative process; that every 
country will need to have a conversation about national targets and indicators to 













B. LNA Methodology 
 
The LNA has three substantive focus areas. These were areas that the 
stakeholders whom we initially consulted felt would yield the biggest 
qualitative differences between Bhutanese and global understandings of 
justice. The three areas are (1) traditional dispute resolution practices, (2) 
what individuals and communities perceive as an “injustice,” and how (or 
whether) they empirically seek to pursue justice in such situations, and (3) 
small-business entrepreneurs seeking to develop local and sustainable 
economies. Each of these three focus areas employs different research 
methods, a description of which goes beyond the scope of this paper.18  
This paper draws directly on the first of those substantive focus areas, 
and indirectly on the other two. During our research, which—at the time of 
this writing—has already covered seventeen of Bhutan’s twenty 
dzongkhags,19 we interviewed more than two hundred dispute resolution 
practitioners. About half of those were local government (LG) leaders 
tasked with a modern mediation mandate.20 The other half might best be 
described as “village elders,” who in the past used to be responsible for 
dispute resolution at the village level. Most of the elders we spoke to were 
in their sixties, seventies, eighties, or older. Some of those village elders still 
work as traditional dispute resolution practitioners (TDRPs), whereas others 
had given up their work as TDRPs and spoke to us instead about how they 
did their work in the past. Almost all of our dispute resolution interviewees 
were male, except for some still relatively rare examples of female elected 
LG leaders. Our research took us to numerous cultural zones of Bhutan, 
including the politically dominant Ngalop ethnolinguistic communities in 
the north and northwest, the Bumthap communities in the central-northern 
part of Bhutan, the Shershop communities in the eastern dzongkhags, as 
well as the Lhotshampa/Nepali communities in the south of the country. In 
between these dominant ethnolinguistic groups, we also encountered 
 
hybrid models may be necessary to measure complex concepts of peace, justice 
and institutions. 
See MILANTE ET AL., supra note 12, at 11. 
18.  LNA FINAL REPORT, supra note 3. 
19.  These are the first-level administrative divisions of Bhutan. For more detail on the 
administrative divisions of Bhutan, see infra note 117. 
20.  See infra Part 0. 
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numerous smaller other communities.21 In each, we sought out elders, 
seeking to document significant differences in how TDRPs handled 
disputes. We also spoke with individuals who had a case handled by either 
an LG leader or a TDRP, to learn from them about their experiences and 
expectations as they pursued justice. 
To get a sense of comparing systematically the approach used by 
TDRPs, we used a set of fictional case studies drawn from the everyday 
context of village life in Bhutan. These case studies were designed to set up 
dispute resolution choices for the interviewee. Once the scenario was clear, 
we would ask the interviewees how they would think about various 
inflection points. For example, in a scenario involving a boy being harassed 
by his classmates because of (essentially) his gender identity, the elder was 
asked whether it would be more important to express to the boy that he was 
fine exactly the way he was (thus demonstrating a preference for an 
approach towards dispute resolution prioritizing the dignity of the parties) 
or whether instead it would be better not to express such empathy (thus 
revealing a preference for role neutrality).22 Listening not only to their 
answer, but also their explanatory logic, we deduced and subsequently 
coded23 the underlying normative principles behind each interviewee’s 
approach to dispute resolution. Over time, we began to notice a 
preoccupation with the fundamental dignity of the disputants across the 
many TDRP interviews, which is why we began to describe their style of 
dispute resolution as “dignity-centric mediation” (DCM). As I describe 
below, this traditional style of Bhutanese dispute resolution is different from 
the modern style of mediation (often referred to as “Nangkha Nangdrik”) 
practiced by the LG leaders. For the sake of clarity, I will refer below to this 
modern style as an “administrative adjudication” process. Much of our 
interviews focused on how dispute resolution practices have changed during 
the past several decades. These various interviews, even when not 
 
21.  In particular, we spent time in a Layap community in Gasa Dzongkhag, Khengpa 
communities in Zhemgang and Mongar Dzongkags, a Lhop community in Samtse Dzongkhag, a Brokpa 
community in Trashigang Dzongkhag, a Gongdup community in Mongar, and a Monap community in 
Trongsa. 
22.  For those who are curious, the overwhelming majority of those whom we interviewed 
demonstrated a strong preference for the former—dignity-honoring—choice in this scenario.  
23.  To code their responses, we used Donna Hicks’ Ten Elements of Human Dignity. DONNA 













specifically cited, constitute the raw material for much of the analysis that 
follows. 
 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
This first discussion of this part of the paper briefly describes the 
traditional Bhutanese model of dispute resolution. The description shall 
serve as a baseline for the discussion that follows, allowing us to understand 
how dispute resolution practice has evolved during the past seven decades. 
Bhutan’s recent history allows us to pinpoint the moment—1959—when 
Bhutan’s dispute resolution landscape began to transition. In that year, the 
then King of Bhutan, His Majesty (HM)24 Jigme Dorji Wangchuck 
(commonly referred to as “K3”), began a series of sweeping reforms of the 
country’s justice system.25 Prior to that time, almost all cases were handled 
by local dispute resolvers in the manner described below. The only 
historical exceptions were very serious crimes such as murder, theft or 
desecration of religious objects, and treason, which were adjudicated by the 
King himself or his immediate regional representatives.26 That system, and 
the norms based upon which those cases were decided, are still well within 
the living memories of many elders living in Bhutanese communities today. 
This is especially true given how long it took for the impact of K3’s reforms 





24.  Throughout this paper, I will use honorific titles for Bhutanese historical figures that 
correspond to conventions in Bhutan, where it would come across as disrespectful to not describe, for 
example, a member of the Royal Family with an honorific title and corresponding capitalization 
conventions. While this may appear unusual from a non-Bhutanese perspective, it is essential to ensure 
the readability of this text in Bhutan as well as in St. Louis. 
25.  See Simoni & Whitecross, supra note 4, at 172. 
26.  Interview with Dasho Jambey in Bumthang, Bhutan (Aug. 29, 2019); Interview with Dasho 
Lhadala in Bumthang, Bhutan (Sept. 6, 2019); see also Simoni & Whitecross, supra note 4, at 172–73 
(describing the various reforms, including the creation of the National Assembly, that occurred under 
HM the Third King). 
27.  This assertion draws primarily on our own research with elders in various parts of Bhutan, 
but is also reflected in the historical description of the various gradual reforms leading—over forty years 
after the drafting of the Thrimzhung Chenmo in 1959—to Bhutan’s adoption of its modern civil and 
criminal procedure code. See Simoni & Whitecross, supra note 4, at 171-78. 
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A. A Brief Historical Background on Bhutan 
 
In order to understand the social significance of K3’s modernization 
process, one must first have some basic working knowledge of Bhutanese 
history.  Bhutan has existed as a unified political entity only since the late 
seventeenth century, when Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel crossed into 
modern-day Bhutan from Tibet. Zhabdrung came from a lineage of Tibetan 
rulers, and he promptly set about unifying and “bringing civilization to” the 
various tribes and principalities living in the territory of today’s Bhutan.28 
After consolidating power, he put in place Bhutan’s first legal code.29 
Zhabdrung’s law code lays forth a number of obligations, many of them 
specific to one’s professional or governance role in society. Other 
obligations, however, apply to all individuals—regardless of their station in 
life—and are described in terms of ten “unvirtuous deeds” and sixteen “pure 
rules of human conduct,” all of which ought to guide our daily conduct.30 
Taken together, these rules define what is commonly called “tha 
damtshig,”31 and embody the essence of what makes one a good human 
being.32 
Broadly speaking, the immoral acts described in Zhabdrung’s Code 
include some which can typically be enforced in a court of law (for example 
murder or theft), but also others that are almost impossible to grapple with 
in a traditional courtroom setting (for example, respecting one’s elders). 
From a Buddhist perspective, however, the “justiciability” or 
“enforceability” questions are of only secondary relevance. The concept of 
Karma—by which all sentient beings’ rebirth in the next life corresponds to 
the amount of virtue they were able to accumulate (or squander) during their 
 
28.  The culturally loaded terminology of “bringing civilization” to Bhutan is intentional, and 
was seen as an essential quality of a good leader. See WINDISCHGRAETZ & WANGDI, supra note 4, at 
15-16. 
29.  This code is sometimes referred to as the Khathrim, although according to one scholar, “the 
Kathrim dates from around 1729, almost eighty years after the death of the Zhabdrung.” See Whitecross, 
Of Texts and Drama, supra note 4, at 80; see also WINDISCHGRAETZ & WANGDI, supra note 4, at 10–
13 (discussing the controversy surrounding the authorship and nomenclature of the code actually written 
by Zhabdrung or his immediate successors). 
30.  See WINDISCHGRAETZ & WANGDI, supra note 4, at 22–23. 
31.  This term translates literally as “‘the highest promise’ or ‘ultimate vow’” from the word 
damtshig, referring to the Buddhist vows (samaya). Whitecross, Virtuous Beings, supra note 4, at 71. 
32.  See id. for a discussion also of how the concept of tha damtshig has been politicized, giving 













current lifetimes—exists to take care of any imperfections inherent in a 
human-made legal system.33 
Zhabdrung’s reign in Bhutan lasted from approximately 1639 to 1708.34 
As strange as it may sound, Zhabdrung himself was not alive for most of 
that reign, since the fact of his death, likely in 1651, was hidden from the 
people until 1708 for fear that this might cause the country to descend into 
renewed political chaos.35 Indeed, such fears were appropriate: following 
Zhabdrung’s death, the country descended into a state of prolonged civil 
strife that ended only with the consolidation of power by Bhutan’s first 
modern-day monarch, HM Ugyen Wangchuck, in the late nineteenth 
century.36 During the interim period, a number of regional lords (penlops) 
wielded tremendous power within their fiefdoms, but were highly 
vulnerable to rivals contesting that power. A tumultuous history of 
assassinations, intrigues, periodic raids by Tibetan invaders and bandits, and 
conspiracies make Bhutan during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries37 
seem remarkably different from the Bhutan of today, which is often idolized 
in tourist literature as the world’s “last Shangri-la.” 
To make matters worse, Bhutan during that time was beginning to come 
into contact with a new regional hegemon. Prior to the late eighteenth 
century, the local hegemon in Bhutan had always been Tibet.38 Tibet was a 
 
33.  In the Buddhist tradition, Karma is not to be understood as “fate.” Rather, it is “created and 
perpetuated by our actions as we continue living—by our individual actions, and by our interactions 
with others.” TRALEG KYABGON, KARMA: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT ISN'T, WHY IT MATTERS 57 (2015); see 
also REBECCA FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET 63 (Cornell 
Univ. Press 1995) (describing how Tibetan dispute resolvers would frequently refer to the concept of 
Karma in adjudicating disputes: “Tibetan law . . . is situated in a present that expands into otherworldly 
realms of the past and the future. Since any act done by anyone at any time is the result of both previous 
karma and the present possible exercise of will, a crime could have its cause in a previous life, its 
commission in this life, and its punishment in a future life in a lower or more difficult rebirth”). 
Whitecross also alludes to the role of Karma when he describes how debates over whether to abolish the 
death penalty for those accused of robbing religious sites: “The immense [karmic] negativity associated 
with these crimes was . . . so awful that many felt that it was not necessary to execute these criminals. 
Rather, it would be better for them and for society, to try to rehabilitate them.” Whitecross, 
Transgressing the Law, supra note 4, at 69-70. 
34.  See KARMA PHUNTSHO, THE HISTORY OF BHUTAN, 207–304 (Haus Publ’g 2013). 
35.  Id. at 249-51; see also KARMA CHODEN & DORJI WANGCHUK, BHUTAN – CULTURE 
SMART!: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO CUSTOMS & CULTURE (2018) 19. 
36.  PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 273–512. 
37.  Id. at 305-41, 371-85, 389-440, 468-78; see also CHODEN & WANGCHUK, supra note 35, at 
20. 
38.  “Until the beginning of the 17th century, Bhutan’s history was primarily one of minor 
invasions from Tibet, the movement of lamas across the Himalayas on missionary ventures and the 








154            Washington University Journal of Law and Policy        [Vol. 63 
 
large and powerful empire, and Bhutan was situated along its borderlands. 
Consequently, Bhutan’s trade, cultural, religious and also security 
relationships were all oriented principally around its complicated 
relationship with Tibet.39 This dynamic began to change in 1773, when the 
British Empire first took an interest in Bhutan.40  Bhutan—in the eyes of the 
British cartographers—was considered important only as a potential trade 
route between their Indian possessions and the Tibetan empire, and thus a 
strategic priority.41 Later , the British also saw Bhutan as a potential bulwark 
against a rebellion by some Nepali elites against the British presence in the 
Himalayan region.42  
The British presence was arguably one of the factors that precipitated 
the consolidation of Bhutanese political power into a unified monarchy in 
1907. Ugyen Wangchuck, who by 1886—at the age of 24—had essentially 
consolidated his power over all of Bhutan, enjoyed the trust of the British 
Empire’s representatives, and was famously awarded with the insignia of 
the Knight Commander of the Indian Empire in 1905.43 Two years later, in 
1907, he was crowned as the hereditary monarch of Bhutan, with the British 
envoy in attendance.44 That said, Bhutan’s new King had to play Bhutan’s 
diplomatic hand skillfully to avoid the gradual absorption of the Bhutanese 
state into the British fold. In 1910, in response to increasingly aggressive 
claims by the Chinese that Bhutan fell under its jurisdiction,45 Bhutan’s 
King signed a treaty granting the British the right to assume control over 
 
spread of Buddhism.” Thomas A. Marks, Historical Observations on Buddhism in Bhutan, 2 TIBET J. 
74, 74 (1977); see also K. Dhondup, Tibet’s Influence in Ladakh and Bhutan, 2 TIBET J. 69 (1977). 
39.  Dawa Norbu likens the role of ancient Tibet to “the Vatican of Mahayana Buddhism” with 
Tibet’s relationship to Bhutan falling into the mold of a “priest-disciple relationship.” Norbu continues 
that “religion is the idiom and format of such diplomacy but its content can vary including political, 
military, economic matters.” Dawa Norbu, The Europeanization of Sino-Tibetan Relations, 1775-1907: 
The Genesis of Chinese "Suzerainty" and Tibetan "Autonomy", 15 TIBET J. 28, 38 (1990).  
40.  In 1773, Major James Rennell, first Surveyor-General of India, launched a military 
expedition against Bhutan in response to the Bhutanese kidnapping a regional power broker in Cooch 
Behar, which Bhutan saw as a crucial buffer state to the British East India Company’s presence in 
Bengal. This military intervention marked the beginning of the British Empire’s military, diplomatic and 
economic entreaties towards Bhutan (and Tibet). See A.R. Field, A NOTE CONCERNING EARLY ANGLO-
BHUTANESE RELATIONS, 13 EAST & WEST 340 (1962). See also PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 347-54. 
41.  PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 354. 
42.  Id. at 401. 
43.  Id. at 508. 
44.  Id. at 520. 













Bhutan’s foreign policy.46 In return, the British acknowledged Bhutan’s 
uncompromised sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs.47 This 
suited the British well, who had no interest in governing Bhutan per se, but 
wanted only to guarantee that the country wouldn’t cause trouble for 
Britain’s broader regional ambitions.48 This arrangement, which essentially 
split Bhutan’s sovereignty into a domestic half and a foreign-policy half, 
was only formally undone in 2007.49 It also explains the obsessive focus of 
contemporary Bhutanese policymakers on the preservation, cultivation and 
reinforcement of an uncompromised and integrated sense of national 
sovereignty. Coming as close as it did to political annihilation during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Bhutan’s entire political system today is 
oriented around the preservation of Bhutan as a sovereign nation.50  
 
1. Diversity of Traditions 
 
Turning now from a discussion of Bhutan’s neighborhood politics to 
the local level, one can see how Bhutan’s elite during the tumultuous era 
lasting roughly from the time of Zhabdrung’s death in the seventeenth 
century to the establishment of the Wangchuck Dynasty in 1908 were far 
too preoccupied with the geopolitical dimensions of maintaining their 
power to care too deeply about matters of local governance. To be sure, this 
is undoubtedly an oversimplification. Presumably, the various penlops and 
 
46.  See T.T. Poulose, Bhutan’s External Relations and India, 20 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 195, 196-
98 (1971). 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id.  
49.  When the British ended their colonial presence in India in 1949, the newly formed Indian 
state inherited the rights and obligations of the former British counterparties to the Treaty of Punakha. 
De facto, this state of affairs began to erode with Bhutan gradually and carefully asserting its own 
diplomatic presence, becoming a member first of the Colombo Plan and later the United Nations in 1971. 
Each such diplomatic step had to be carefully negotiated and coordinated with the Indian foreign policy 
establishment, and thus necessitated a very delicate process. See, e.g., Manorama Kohli, Dragon 
Kingdom’s Urge for an International Role, 37 INDIA Q. 227 (1981) (describing India’s diplomatic 
consternation over Bhutan’s decision to break with Indian policy with regard to the recognition of 
Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge government). In 2007, the Treaty of Punakha was formally renegotiated, with 
Bhutan legally regaining its full and uncompromised sovereignty. Nonetheless, the reality of Bhutan’s 
geopolitical situation, wedged between the two most populous nations on earth—China and India—both 
of which happen to be embroiled in an intense and highly militarized regional power contest, requires 
that it continue to play a very careful diplomatic game to appease the two leering giants beyond its 
tranquil borders. See PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 572–76. 
50.  TOBGYE, supra note 4, at 24. 
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other local governors still had some presence in the communities. First and 
foremost, they had to ensure that taxes were collected and local political 
allegiances maintained, lest they run out of the raw materials necessary to 
continue running their fiefdoms. Consequently, the principal institutions of 
government with a presence in the region were those related to the collection 
of tax.51 These positions were generally given out as rewards to loyal 
patrons of the regional governors, and came with great power and generous 
benefits (today, one might describe this more appropriately as a license to 
engage in moderately unchecked corruption52). Echoing this ancient role of 
the formal and non-local institutions, even today, many whom we 
interviewed still describe the formal national law as a “predator, not a 
protector” (in other words, a force to be feared, not a source of resilience for 
those who suffered an injustice).53 The only significant exception to that is 
any initiative associated with the Wangchuck Monarchy, which since its 
origins in the late nineteenth century, has in many ways become the 
embodiment of justice incarnate in Bhutan.54 
Other than the centralized collection of taxes, however, the management 
of local affairs was historically left almost exclusively to the discretion of 
local officials.55 This is the key point from a dispute resolution perspective. 
It means that local leaders were the ones to resolve the vast majority of 
disputes and lower-level criminal offenses. Except for very serious crimes, 
or crimes that affected the narrow interests of the national authorities 
(taxation, treason, or very serious crimes such as murder or the desecration 
of religious monuments), local leaders were left to their own devices to 
 
51.  Ardussi and Ura describe a document describing a celebration commemorating the 
enthronement in 1747 of a new religious head of state in which all families in Bhutan are enumerated 
based on their taxpayer status, revealing the complex system of tax collection that lasted largely 
unchanged until the 1950s. John Ardussi & Karma Ura, Population and Governance in Mid-18th 
Century Bhutan, as Revealed in the Enthronement Record of Thugs-sprul ’Jigs Med Grags pa I (1725-
1761), 2 J. BHUTAN STUD. 36 (2000). 
52.  According to our interviews, if local tax collectors got too bold in their efforts to enrich 
themselves, the King—at least during the reign of the Wangchuck Dynasty—might come down on them 
quite hard. Language to this effect also exists in Zhabdrung’s law code. See  WINDISCHGRAETZ & 
WANGDI, supra note 4 at 29, 35–36. Judging from our conversations with elders, however, our 
impression is that during the period between Zhabdrung and the Wangchuck Dynasty, the regional tax 
collectors engaged in widespread, sometimes arbitrary, and often unchecked abuse of their power. Id.  
53.  Anonymous interview in Samdrup Jongkhar Dzongkhag, Bhutan (Dec. 9, 2019); see also 
Simoni & Whitecross supra note 4, at 174. 
54.  Consistently across a majority of our interviews, the role of the monarchy was described to 
us as taming the unruly and oftentimes unjust governance structures described above.   













manage their communities’ disputes.56 Indeed, not only were they allowed 
to do so, they in fact had a very strong incentive to handle such community 
disputes. Given the political environment at the time, elevating any dispute 
to the national level risked having it resolved by political actors with little 
interest in the maintenance of peace and harmony. Instead, communities 
kept their heads down, selecting local leaders who were skillful at resolving 
disputes quietly, sustainably, and locally. Thus, in pre-1907 Bhutan, the 
concept of community leadership became closely intertwined with the 
concept of skillful conflict management. 
The other point that bears some emphasis is that there was not—at that 
time—one unified national Bhutanese model of dispute resolution. While 
there was certainly a trend,57 there remained ample opportunity for local 
innovation and diversity. These innovations in dispute resolution style 
might vary based upon the cultural, religious, and social dynamics particular 
to each region of Bhutan, as well as the individual dispute resolvers’ 
capacity for creativity. Until much more recently, the central authorities 
simply did not care much how disputes were resolved, only that indeed they 
were ultimately resolved.58 As a result, one might describe the two centuries 
between Zhabdrung’s time and K3’s reign as an extraordinarily vibrant 
laboratory for various locally-grounded dispute resolution methods, 
evolving over time to ideally meet the unique nature of Bhutanese society. 
 
2. Political History Since 1907 
 
As mentioned above, the Wangchuck Dynasty was established in 1907, 
with the consolidation of power under Ugyen Wangchuck. The subsequent 
reign of the Wangchuck Dynasty is typically organized by rulers. HM the 
First King, Ugyen Wanghcuck’s reign (1907–26) and HM the Second King, 
Jigme Wangchuck’s reign (1927–52), are often described as periods of 
 
56.  Whitecross, Of Texts and Drama, supra note 4, at 84. 
57.  Infra Subsection III.A.0. 
58.  Simoni and Whitecross described in 2007 how, since the late 1970s, policymakers have 
begun to think of dispute resolution as part of a unifying nation-building narrative, according to which 
certain non-Buddhist dispute resolution practices, notably the Nepali/Lhotshampa dispute resolution 
practices common in the southern regions of Bhutan, were “rendered officially invisible.” Simoni & 
Whitecross, supra note 4, at 188-90. In contrast, our own research, which took place more than a decade 
later, found no evidence of official aversion to the Samaach system. 
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political consolidation.59 These two first Monarchs had to overcome some 
residual resistance to the centralization of political power, for example a 
tussle over power between the Second King and an ambitious reincarnation 
of Zhabdrung.60 At the international level, the time period was also a 
tumultuous one, with the world plunging into two world wars, violent 
revolutions, and political turmoil.61 As a result of this unrest, the dynamics 
described above, with local communities retaining maximal authority to 
handle their own affairs, remained largely unchanged. 
This situation began to change in the 1950s, during K3’s reign (1952–
72). K3 is generally seen as Bhutan’s modernizer and reformer.62 He first 
opened Bhutan’s doors to outsiders and opened the eyes of the Bhutanese 
to the outside world.63 He embarked upon an aggressive campaign to build 
 
59.  See Whitecross, Of Texts and Drama, supra note 4, at 86; see also DORJI WANGCHUK, 
FOUNDATIONS OF BHUTAN HISTORY: A CONSISE GUIDE 66-91, 107-28 (2016) (providing a more 
detailed history of the rise to power of HM the First King Ugyen Wangchuck and the moves to 
consolidate and cement that power under the HM the Second King Jigme Wangchuck, primarily by 
means of administrative and tax reforms). 
60.  See PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 550–56. 
61.  In India “[a]s many as 74,187 Indian soldiers died during the [First World W]ar and a 
comparable number were wounded” serving “the very British Empire that was oppressing their own 
people back home.” Back in India, the country was “wracked by high taxation to support the war and 
the high inflation accompanying it, while the disruption of trade caused by the conflict led to widespread 
economic losses—all this while the country was also reeling from a raging influenza epidemic that took 
many lives.” Following the war, the British imposed strict anti-sedition laws that led to more death, 
repression and suffering. Shashi Tharoor, Why the Indian Soldiers of WW1 Were Forgotten, BBC (July 
2, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33317368 [https://perma.cc/N3FH-99SX]. A few 
decades later, the Second World War came again to deplete Indian families. “When it ended in 1945, 
over two [and a] half million Indians had borne arms voluntarily. Over 90,000 of these had been killed 
or had gone missing in action. Many millions more had been employed in the war effort, in 
manufacturing, agriculture, construction, services to the military and transport.” Nigel Collett, India’s 
War: World War II and the Making of Modern South Asia, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 27, 2016) (reviewing 
SRINATH RAGHAVAN, INDIA’S WAR (2016)), https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/review-indias-war-
world-war-ii-and-the-making-of-modern-south-asia/ [https://perma.cc/XX45-5S8E]. Tibet, on the other 
side of Bhutan, gave “positive and generous” support to Britain and her allies during the First World 
War, but remained strictly neutral during the Second World War. Nirmal Sinha, Tibet's Status During 
the World War, 2 BULL. TIBETOLOGY 31, 35 (1965). In Southeast Asia, the First World War cost an 
estimated twenty thousand lives, “mostly conscripts from the French colonies.” David Hutt, The Great 
War’s Impact on Southeast Asia, SOUTHEAST ASIA GLOBE (Nov. 11, 2018), 
https://southeastasiaglobe.com/wwi-centenary/# [https://perma.cc/8MXK-3QQU]. And, of course, the 
ravages of World War II on Asia as a whole are well known and well beyond the scope of one footnote 
to summarize in all of their horrifying detail. Throughout this period, Bhutan was diplomatically isolated 
from the rest of the world, and save for some minor monetary contributions in solidarity to the British, 
completely unaffected by these humanitarian calamities. See PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 560.   
62.  See, e.g., Simoni & Whitecross, supra note 4, at 170. 













the nation’s infrastructure, beginning with the country’s first road from the 
Indian border to Thimphu, the country’s new capital. K3 also reaffirmed the 
strong diplomatic, financial and military relationship that his predecessor 
had established with a newly independent India. K3 also made a major push 
to modernize the country’s bureaucracy, adopting the Indian practice and 
vocabulary of prioritizing its national investments according to five-year 
development plans.64  
Of central significance to K3’s modernization push was the creation of 
an independent judiciary. Early during his reign, K3 drafted an important 
legal code—the Thrimzhung Chenmo. Unlike those drafted in the eighteenth 
century, however, the Thrimzhung Chenmo had a distinctly modern flair.65 
K3 himself oversaw and meticulously scrutinized the Thrimzhung 
Chenmo’s drafting process.66 The text of Bhutan’s first modern legal code 
went into much more granular detail than any of its predecessors in terms 
of how Bhutanese citizens should behave, how crimes were defined, etc.67 
The Thrimzhung Chenmo also explicitly delineated the limits of traditional 
dispute resolvers to oversee “negotiated settlements”—in other words, to 
mediate a case.68 According to the new code, it defined any case—criminal 
or civil—as eligible for mediation as long as it was not what in today’s 
language we might refer to as a felony.69 Given that the code only graded 
certain offenses in those terms,70 this standard merely reaffirmed the 
previous jurisdictional division of labor between the King and the village 
elders, transferring the King’s former adjudicative function to the newly-
minted courts.71 The courts, therefore, were initially designed to handle only 
the very most serious of criminal cases. This legacy persists to this day, 
where the courts and large parts of Bhutan’s legal community continue to 
look at the world through what I describe as “criminal-tinted sunglasses.” 
 
64.  See supra note 9. The first development plan spanned from 1963-68. 
65.  See Whitecross, Thrimzhung Chenmo, supra note 4. 
66.  Interview with Dasho Lhadala, supra note 26. See also Simoni, supra note 4, at 34. But see 
Whitecross, Of Texts and Drama, supra note 4, at 86 (claiming, somewhat controversially, that “[t]he 
new law code was less a codification of existing Bhutanese laws than an entirely new law code drawn 
mainly from India”). 
67.  Whitecross, Of Texts and Drama, supra note 4, at 87. 
68.  Duffy, Nangkha Nangdrik, supra note 4, at 336. 
69.  The term in the Thrimzhung Chenmo was a “non-compoundable” offense, which today 
equates with a felony charge. See Penal Code of Bhutan art. 70 (2004). 
70.  Including murder, treason, and vandalism of religious monuments. 
71.  See also Simoni & Whitecross, supra note 4, at 173. 
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This is the point where I will momentarily pause our description of 
Bhutan’s process of judicial or justice landscape modernization. As I hinted 
above, our research considers the establishment in 1959 of Bhutan’s modern 
judiciary as the moment when the country’s entire system of understanding 
right and wrong—in other words its “justice cosmology”—began gradually 
to transition. After briefly describing the country’s economic development 
during this same time period, and presenting a sketch of the style of 
mediation prevalent in Bhutanese communities circa 1959, I will describe 
how that gradual transition slowly unfolded in Bhutanese communities.  
 
3. Development Context 
 
K3 also instituted a number of economic reforms. Those reforms only 
continued and accelerated under the reign of his two successors, HM Jigme 
Singye Wangchuck (K4) and HM Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck (K5). 
The first was that Bhutan put in place specific economic reforms aimed at 
cultivating economic growth. The country opened itself to foreign direct 
investment (primarily from India) and increasingly large-scale international 
tourism.72 From the outset, Bhutan’s tourism policy was designed to bring 
crucially necessary foreign hard currency into the country.73 The country 
also increasingly supported private individuals to engage in lucrative, if 
carefully regulated, income-generation opportunities.74  
The gradual introduction of cash-based economic activities 
fundamentally altered the nature of Bhutan’s society. This process is 
ongoing even today. For one, it facilitated the growth of Bhutan’s urban 
areas, allowing (even requiring) more and more people to move to the cities 
and participate in an exclusively cash-based economy.75 The cash economy 
also started to change economic life in Bhutan’s rural areas. Historically, 
families living in Bhutan’s rural communities (still today a majority of 
 
72.  Tandin Dorji, Sustainability of Tourism in Bhutan, 3 J. BHUTAN STUD. 84 (2010); see also 
Tara Limbu, Bhutan Opens its Doors, but Few Foreign Investors are Ready to Come In, NIKKEI ASIAN 
REV. (May 5, 2016), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Bhutan-opens-its-doors-but-few-foreign-
investors-are-ready-to-come-in [https://perma.cc/GY2W-N5LZ]; Bhutan Approves 64 FDIs in 15 Years, 
KUENSEL (May 23, 2018), https://kuenselonline.com/bhutan-approves-64-fdis-in-15-years-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/2M5C-78FT]. 
73.  Dorji, supra note 72. 
74.  LNA FINAL REPORT, supra note 3. 













Bhutan’s population) relied on their own cultivation to sustain themselves 
throughout the year.76 As markets grew in Bhutan’s urban areas, and 
demand for certain types of “cash crops” grew, households in rural areas 
began to respond by cultivating or even monocropping those cash crops for 
sale in urban and even international markets.77 Some regions of Bhutan 
experienced an explosion of wealth as a result. For example, Bumthang—a 
district in Bhutan’s central region—went from being one of the poorest 
regions of Bhutan to one if its most prosperous on the back of the humble 
potato.78 But this infusion of cash also changed those rural economies. 
Whereas before, people had largely relied on an informal system of helping 
one another in times of need, the introduction of cash began to dry up those 
informal bartered exchanges of goods and services, replacing them instead 
with cash-based transactions.79  
The psychological impacts of these various changes were profound, and 
frequently commented upon by the elder dispute resolvers we interviewed, 
who described to us how the gradual “monetization” of local economies 
went hand in hand with a more “win-lose” mindset among parties embroiled 
in a community dispute.80 Whereas in the past, values such as compassion 
and neighborly collaboration would color how people might approach a 
dispute, increasingly, elders described for us how parties gradually became 
more concerned about “winning and losing,” or “getting what one is due.” 
However, one should not paint an overly one-sided picture of Bhutan’s 
economy. Indeed, Bhutan today is globally perhaps best known for the 
concept of GNH.81 From an economic perspective, one of the major talking 
 
76.  SNV, a Dutch nonprofit international development organization, estimates that sixty-nine 
percent of Bhutan’s population is rural, and most of them are dependent on subsistence farming. See 
Climate Smart Agriculture—Bhutan, SNV, https://snv.org/project/climate-smart-agriculture-bhutan 
[https://perma.cc/62GR-29X8]. This situation is gradually changing, however. See Tashi Dendup, 
Agricultural Transformation in Bhutan: From Peasants to Entrepreneurial Farmers, 23 ASIAN J. 
AGRIC. EXTENSION, ECON. & SOC. 1 (2018). 
77.  Interview with Dasho Neten Zangmo & Dasho Tashi Dorji in Samdrup Jongkhar 
Dzongkhag, Bhutan (Dec. 9, 2019). 
78.  Interview with Dasho Fritz Maurer in Bumthang Dzongkhag, Bhutan (Aug. 8, 2019). 
79.  Interview with Kuenzang Peldon in Trashiyangtse Dzongkhag, Bhutan (Nov. 8, 2019). 
80.  LNA FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-31. By “win-lose mindset,” I refer to the idea that 
one person’s “win” must come at the expense of another person’s material interests, as is often the case 
in a classical bargaining or haggling scenario, in which a merchant “wins” to the extent he or she can 
increase the price of a good, at the direct expense of the consumer (and vice versa). The opposite of such 
a zero-sum mindset (the “win-win” mindset) looks to identify and build on other interests, for example 
a reputation for fairness, repeat business, and the value of social trust.  
81.  McCarthy, supra note 10. 
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points for GNH was for Bhutan’s planners to chart a Buddhist-inspired 
“middle path” for the economy.82 In concrete terms, this meant neither 
ignoring the need to foster the nation’s economic growth, nor sacrificing all 
other social, environmental, cultural, or governance priorities in favor of 
only unbridled economic growth. This development philosophy, which was 
first articulated in the early 1970s by K483 led, for example, to a ban on the 
rampant deforestation of the country and a very reasoned approach towards 
the extractive industries. GNH also introduced a strong and unifying 
narrative in Bhutan, emphasizing the need to “go slow” on economic 
growth, especially if that growth begins to threaten the integrity and 
cohesion of Bhutanese village life.84 Whether this “middle-path” approach 
towards the country’s economic development can survive the pressures of 
democratic governance is a question that is increasingly being raised by 
those concerned that modern politicians have perhaps abandoned the core 
principles of GNH. 
 
B. “Dignity-Centric Style of Mediation” 
 
As described above,85 the survey of Bhutan’s modern history “pushed 
pause” around 1959, when K3 breathed life into Bhutan’s modern legal 
system. By way of establishing a baseline for subsequent discussions, I will 
 
82.  MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 107. 
83.  Lyonchhen Jigmi Y Thinley and Dr. Ron Coleman both claim that HM Jigme Singye 
Wangchuck coined the term “Gross National Happiness” in 1974. See id. at 1, 22.  
84.  Justifying Bhutan’s critique of gross domestic product (GDP) (or gross national product) as 
the sole measure of economic progress, Jigmi Y Thinley, Bhutan’s first Prime Minister, in 2011 warned 
that the  
use of [GDP] as the singular driver of development resulted in our pursuit of 
limitless growth in a finite world . . . . It failed to take into account those aspects 
of development or changes that matter equally or more to human wellbeing. We 
ignored those mounting costs arising from activities to raise GDP. In the process, 
we have destroyed much of real and natural wealth that belong not only to our 
generations but to those unborn as well and all other life forms with whom we 
share this planet. We have done so for the sake of what we now begin to see are 
destructive illusions of prosperity, bringing upon ourselves an escalating number 
and magnitude of crises.  
Jigmi Y Thinley, Gross National Happiness: A Holistic Paradigm for Sustainable Development, Fourth 
Professor Hiren Mukerjee Memorial Lecture Before the Indian Parliament (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://apfanews.com/commentary/gross-national-happiness-a-holistic-paradigm-for-sustainable-
development.html [https://perma.cc/HA28-HXRN]. 













briefly describe what Bhutan’s informal dispute resolution processes—
which I describe as “dignity-centric mediation”86 (DCM)—looked like 
around that time. 
1. Buddhist Normative Anchors 
 
First, it will perhaps come as no surprise that the normative anchors of 
Bhutan’s style of traditional dispute resolution—DCM—is a series of 
powerful Buddhist ideas about right and wrong. Strictly speaking, this 
situates our description of DCM geographically in the northwestern part of 
Bhutan, and culturally in what might best be described as Bhutan’s Ngalop 
(Dzongkha-speaking and Buddhist) ethno-linguistic heartland.87 As we 
documented in our research, however, the DCM style of mediation also has 
a great deal of resonance in non-Buddhist and other minority communities, 
facilitated by the spread of secular (albeit Buddhist-inspired) “modern” 
national narratives such as GNH.88 During the 1900s, large numbers of 
Nepali migrants began to settle throughout southern Bhutan at the invitation 
of the early Bhutanese Kings, who wanted to more heavily populate this 
border region and maximize its agricultural potential.89 These Nepali (or 
Lhotshampa) migrants brought with them very different normatively 
grounded traditions of dispute resolution, steeped in Hindu legal concepts.90 
While the form and outward manifestations of these dispute resolution 
traditions were perhaps novel to Bhutan, their function turned out to be quite 
similar, and, as I will describe below, they began to converge quite fluently 
with the introduction of more secularized, unifying and state-centric 
normative ideas in the late twentieth century. 
 
86.  In addition to DCM, there were also other ways in which third parties might have historically 
intervened in a dispute. Individuals familiar with bureaucratic processes, for example, would sometimes 
serve as jabmis, essentially representing the interests of their clients involved in a bureaucratic or judicial 
process. These jabmis served a similar function to today’s lawyers. Elders within the family also 
provided an important source of dispute resolution, primarily with regard to disputes within the family. 
Finally, influential individuals within the community would sometimes weigh in with decisionmakers 
on appeals concerning the interests of less influential individuals in their communities, amplifying the 
priority accorded to that case. This paper focuses only on DCM.  
87.  See also Simoni & Whitecross, supra note 4, at 188. 
88.  LNA FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 79-80, 86-90. 
89.  See PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 494. 
90.  Interviews with Lhotshampa elders in Chuckha, Samtse, Samdrup Jongkhar Sarpang, 
Tsirang and Dagana Dzongkhags, Bhutan (Jan., Feb. & Dec. 2019; Jan. & Feb. 2020). 
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In the northern parts of Bhutan, the elders we interviewed had a strong 
fluency with Buddhist principles. Many of them were religiously educated. 
Most did not consider their familiarity with these principles to be 
representative of any education. In fact, most initially apologized to us for 
being “uneducated,” and thus unable to help us with our research. Instead, 
they thought of their awareness of these principles as a wisdom that comes 
with piety and increasing age. As we describe in the final report for the 
LNA, the core concept that articulates the focus of a mediator practicing a 
“dignity-centric” style of dispute resolution is—as the name would imply—
the preservation and enhancement of human dignity throughout the process. 
[W]hy “dignity?” . . . The concept of dignity can be 
derived from an examination of the Buddhist concepts of 
interconnectedness, impermanence, and compassion. It 
comes from the realization that if, as Buddhist teachings 
would suggest, there is no such thing as an “individual” 
human being, the quest for individual satisfaction or 
happiness in a dispute must also be an unattainable 
aspiration. The concept of interconnectedness requires of a 
disputant that his or her personal quest for a satisfactory 
outcome be indistinguishable from efforts to ensure that 
others in society—indeed all others in society—are also 
satisfied by that outcome. This discourse resonates strongly 
with the often-used mantra of a mediator to seek out so-
called “win-win” solutions, as opposed to the “winner-take-
all” model of deciding who in a dispute is “right,” who is 
“wrong,” and allocating blame and punishments 
accordingly. 
Buddhism does not merely encourage a quest for win-
win solutions, however. It also suggests a particular focus 
for the dispute resolver’s value creating and problem 
solving. Firstly, the Buddhist concept of impermanence 
suggests that any material gains (or losses) associated with 
a legal dispute are meaningless. Secondly, the Buddhist 
concept of compassion focuses on how we must treat all of 
our fellow human beings (and in fact, all sentient beings), 
even if they happen to be on the other side of a dispute. 













for a dispute resolver, namely that when the dust of a 
dispute settles, the nature of a relationship between the 
disputants matters as much or more than the substantive 
outcome to their dispute.91  
 
2. General Characteristics of This Style of Mediation 
 
As mentioned above, one of the key purposes of DCM was to keep 
disputes from bubbling up beyond the confines of the community. Thus, 
TDRPs had as their primary objectives to keep the peace. One of the most 
frequently repeated parables we heard from elders in the community was 
the rhetorical question of “who will help you most when you are sick: your 
relative living in in another valley or your immediate neighbor in the 
village?” The clear implication was the crucial need to maintain reliable and 
trusting relationships within the village. This was the key selling point that 
elders would use to describe the advantages of their style of DCM vis-à-vis 
the formal court system.  
As we describe in more detail in the LNA’s final report, the centrality 
of dignity was ubiquitous throughout the mediation process.92 Not only 
would the TDRP use the idea of dignity as the ideal for how the parties 
should rework their relationship with one another, but also as his93 own 
personal template for interacting with the parties. The TDRPs we 
interviewed insisted that their own interactions with the disputing parties 
should also be guided by a steadfast commitment to honor and respect the 
dignity of other human beings.  
The TDRPs’ focus on treating disputing parties in ways that honor their 
dignity, and likewise encouraging the disputants to reconceptualize their 
relationship to result in more dignity-honoring interactions amongst 
themselves, resulted in a style of dispute resolution with six noteworthy 
hallmarks.  
 
91.  LNA FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 98. 
92.  Id. 
93.  I am intentionally using gendered language here. While perhaps uncomfortable to read in 
today’s modern era (also in Bhutan, where increasingly men and women serve as dispute resolvers 
today), the focus on male dispute resolvers in this historical discussion reflects the fact that until recently 
only men were called upon to serve as dispute resolvers in any capacity in Bhutan. See id. 
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First, TDRPs demonstrated extraordinary patience in dealing with the 
parties. Cases could take months and even years to complete, and the 
TDRPs would see it as absolutely essential that they proceed only as fast as 
the parties themselves were ready to go when settling a dispute. 
Furthermore, even for seemingly “resolved” disputes, TDRPs would often 
reopen a case without hesitation if ever one or more of the parties expressed 
reservations about a prior agreement.94  
Second, TDRPs would never turn down a case, no matter how 
seemingly trivial that case might appear at first glance. The mere fact that 
disputants agreed to entrust an elder with the task of helping to resolve a 
dispute was fully sufficient to ensure that the elder would take that case 
seriously, regardless of how large or small that dispute might appear. 
Furthermore, quite often a seemingly trivial case would be the outward 
manifestation of a much more profound—if sometimes difficult to 
articulate—grievance, that the skillful TDRP would begin to unravel as he 
started work on the initial dispute as it was originally presented to him.  
Third, most of the TDRPs we interviewed felt strongly that in order for 
any outcomes to be truly sustainable, they must never seek to impose certain 
preferred solutions on the parties, but rather allow the parties themselves to 
generate ideas. 
Fourth, the dispute resolution parties were very clear in distinguishing 
neutrality from impartiality. Most TDRPs we spoke to rejected the notion 
of their own role as a strictly “neutral” intermediary (in the sense that they 
would afford each party exactly the same opportunities to speak and be 
heard), and embraced rather a vision of themselves as “impartial” 
intermediaries (in the sense that they would afford to each party exactly the 
degree of support, space, and coaching that they needed to participate 
equally in the mediation). The standards of when a mediator might intervene 
tracked closely with the elements of dignity described above. Thus, for 
example, if one party would dominate another and actively threaten their 
sense of psychological safety, the TDRP might intervene on behalf of the 
target of such aggression, seeking to rebalance the dynamic. While some 
rare parties would take such interventions as evidence of partisanship or 
 
94.  That said, if the dispute resolution involved a recidivist—someone who demonstrated a 
pattern of similar disputes—either with the same individual or with different individuals in the 
community, most dispute resolvers expressed some limits to their willingness to reopen multiple disputes 













bias, the elders’ prestige as trusted and honorable dispute resolvers would 
usually allow them to stage such careful interventions. 
Fifth, the TDRPs we interviewed were typically masters of symbolism. 
They would often skillfully deploy locally meaningful imagery, rituals, and 
stories to mark key points of the dispute resolution process. Of particular 
concern to many of the TDRPs was the conclusion of a dispute—formally 
marking the laying aside of past grievances in favor of a new and more 
harmonious relationship moving forward. Of central importance in this 
process was the issuance of a meaningful apology. In fact, across all regions 
of Bhutan, spanning the various ethno-linguistic communities in which we 
interviewed, the centrality of a meaningful apology as the hallmark of a 
resolved dispute stood out prominently. One experienced dispute resolver 
even felt that his primary added value in a dispute situation was to coach 
parties on how properly to apologize to one another.95 These apologies were 
then almost always memorialized in the form of a written contractual 
document, or, if no one in the village was available who knew how to write 
such a document, a formal proclamation in the presence of witnesses. These 
written agreements (goenjas), which were drafted in the form of a contract, 
were not specifically intended to be enforceable in court, but nonetheless 
held tremendous value as official markers of the conclusion of a dispute.  
Finally—and crucially—our interviews demonstrate that TDRPs 
worked with parties to articulate disputes in terms of individual 
responsibilities towards others—towards one’s community, one’s 
neighbors, one’s culture, one’s Nation, one’s King, and one’s counterpart in 
a dispute. TDRPs were quite skillful in helping parties reframe a dispute 
away from a grievance suffered—in other words “someone owes me 
something, and I’m angry”—and towards a discussion of responsibilities—
"what responsibility do I personally have towards others in this situation?” 
This reframing from rights to responsibilities allowed the TDRPs to refocus 
many disputes away from a sense of grievance and towards a more forward-
looking and problem-solving mindset. 
Our research also documented a remarkable tradition of passing along 
dispute resolution wisdom from one generation to another. When asked how 
they originally developed their “wisdom” as a dispute resolver, most TDRPs 
 
95.  Interview with Koencho Gyeltshen, in Damji Village, Gasa Dzongkhag, Bhutan (Nov. 11, 
2018). 
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mentioned an informal village culture of “gossip” about disputes that 
surrounded them from an early age. Just like modern office workers might 
debate their armchair coaching theories after a hotly contested sports match, 
so too villagers in Bhutanese communities would discuss their theories on 
how best to work with disputing parties, and gradually accumulate their 
personal collection of dispute resolution anecdotes. Through such banter, 
certain individuals would emerge as particularly wise dispute resolution 
experts. As individuals became known for their wisdom, parties would 
approach them with requests for help resolving a dispute. Younger “novice” 
dispute resolution experts might seek the formal advice of their elders, 
sometimes even co-mediating a dispute. In these ways, the local dispute 
resolution wisdom would be refined and passed down from one generation 
to the next. 
 
III. “MODERNITY” AND CHANGE IN THE BHUTANESE  
DISPUTE RESOLUTION LANDSCAPE 
 
This part of the paper explores how “modernity” in Bhutan has 
impacted dispute resolution practices found in rural96 Bhutanese 
communities. According to our research, DCM is on the verge of extinction 
in Bhutan. As described below, I personally consider this to be a regrettable 
loss for Bhutanese communities. To begin, however, I provide a primarily 
descriptive analysis of this gradual extinction process, derived largely from 
our field research.97 Throughout, I seek to elaborate on some of the reasons 
for this gradual dying off of Bhutan’s traditional dispute resolution 
practices. My discussion focuses on three factors that all had a profound 
impact on the nature of dispute resolution in Bhutan. The first is the subtle 
but important changes in how development itself is framed in Bhutan, and 
the feedback loop that those subtle shifts have had on those who concern 
 
96.  I am limiting this discussion only to rural communities, since the existence of significant 
urban communities is a new phenomenon in Bhutan, and thus the dispute resolution practices in those 
communities cannot be compared to any meaningful precedent. 
97.  This description resonates strongly with Sally Engle Merry’s 1987 critique of what might be 
considered the classic text on Dispute Resolution, in which she describes “an historical pattern of 
oscillation between formal systems of dispute resolution and informal reforms that gradually became 
more formalized, leading to new calls for informal reforms of the now calcified older reform.” Sally 
Engle Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2068 (1987) (reviewing STEPHEN B. 













themselves with the development of Bhutan’s justice sector. The second is 
the reform processes underway in Bhutan’s formal justice system, including 
its courts and its laws. The final factor is the equally ambitious process to 
formalize and harmonize the informal dispute resolution processes as part 
of Bhutan’s modernization process.  
This gradual extinction process was never the result of an intentional 
decision by any one decisionmaker or institution to phase out traditional 
dispute resolution in Bhutan. Quite the opposite: an intention to preserve 
and cultivate traditional dispute resolution practices continues to pervade 
popular narratives about justice sector reform efforts in Bhutan. Instead, it 
is the result of a gradual and almost imperceptible process of replacement, 
where the rhetoric of preserving traditional dispute resolution covers for the 
reality of those very processes being replaced by something altogether 
different. The irony (and presumed controversy) of this analysis is that even 
amidst this good-faith decision by almost98 all relevant stakeholders in 
Bhutan to preserve Bhutan’s dispute resolution traditions, DCM has 
gradually given way to a new and more “modern” style of dispute resolution 
administered by different actors, steeped in a different normative ether, and 
justified with regard to different social objectives.  
 
A. The Quantification of Development 
 
Bhutan’s history of national development has necessitated changes in 
the language and logic uses to describe progress. These semantic shifts have 
changed the way development is typically discussed in Bhutan, and who is 
empowered to have such discussions. 
When it was first coined in the 1970s, the concept of GNH was simple, 
easy to comprehend, and largely subjective. In one simple sentence—that, 
in Bhutan, policymakers concern themselves with maximizing GNH, not 
gross national product—Bhutan’s King captured the humanity and wisdom 
of Bhutan’s approach to development. Even today, this simple phrase 
continues to make intuitive sense, without much need for further 
 
98.  I write “almost” since, as I describe in the conclusion of this article, I wonder whether the 
international community, represented in concrete form by Bhutan’s international development partners, 
shares a genuine concern for the preservation of Bhutan’s informal dispute resolution traditions, or 
whether instead they are content merely to pay convenient lip service to this priority whenever it is raised 
by their Bhutanese counterparts, but in reality are either agnostic to the fate of these traditions or in fact 
actively opposed to their preservation. 
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elaboration. Former prime minister of Bhutan Lyonchhen Jigmi Y Thinley 
described how the idea immediately took hold. “[I]n all [of Bhutan’s] 
development activities, whatever strategies [policymakers] came up with, 
any kind of policy, any kind of development, there has always been the 
question of whether they would really promote the happiness of the 
people.”99 According to Lyonchhen’s account, the subjective nature of GNH 
at the time was perfectly adequate for Bhutan, because  
developing indicators raises a whole lot of questions and 
the possibility of succumbing to a materialist view of what 
constitutes value. There are many difficult questions about 
what is really valuable and what you can actually measure. 
There is also the danger that only those which can be made 
measurable will be pursued while everything else will be 
rendered inconsequential.100  
Namgay Zam, a prominent Bhutanese journalist-blogger puts it more 
pithily: “You don’t quantify Buddhism.”101 
Nevertheless, Bhutan has come to fully embrace the quantification 
process about which Lyonchhen originally expressed his reservations. 
Lyonchhen credits this turn towards quantification to the effort to defend 
and promote GNH internationally. In order to sell the concept of GNH as a 
serious concept to the outside world, Bhutan needed to back up its assertions 
by virtue of supposedly objective “happiness metrics.”102 Or, if I might 
editorialize: “happiness metrics” that would be considered sufficiently 
robust in the eyes of skeptical outside observers to make it a bit more 
challenging for them to reflexively dismiss GNH as naïve and scientifically 
irrelevant.103 Lyonchhen would know: he was the one who in late 1998 first 
elaborated Bhutan’s GNH development policy on the international stage. 
He did so in the keynote speech of the Asia-Pacific Millennium meeting, a 
global forum designed to lay the intellectual groundwork for the process 
 
99.  MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 1. 
100.  Id. at 2. 
101.  McCarthy, supra note 10. 
102.  MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
103.  See also Seth Mydans, Recalculating Happiness in a Himalayan Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 6, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/world/asia/07bhutan.html (quoting Dasho Kinley 
Dorji: “Once Bhutan said, ‘O.K., here we are with G.N.H.,’ the developed world and the World Bank 
and the I.M.F. and so on asked, ‘How do you measure it?’” . . . So the Bhutanese produced an intricate 













that would ultimately result in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Following that speech, Bhutan opened a research center in Thimphu 
devoted to the promotion and study of the concept of GNH. That same 
institution, known today as the Centre for Bhutan Studies and GNH 
Research, eventually came up with a complex methodology to quantify the 
concept of GNH, resulting in today’s well-known GNH Index.104 The Index 
was developed in partnership with scholars from Oxford University, and is 
now calculated every five years in a massive nationwide research effort, 
asking thousands of respondents 148 questions, which together inform a list 
of thirty-three separate indicators, all of which jointly result in a single, 
unitary score on how Bhutan is doing with regard to its pursuit of GNH.105 
Such a massive effort to quantify and measure the concept of GNH—
the same concept that K4 was able to summarize in a few short words—was 
perhaps necessary to convince international audiences that GNH is a 
concept worth being taken seriously. It has also proven remarkably useful 
for policymakers seeking an “objective” barometer of the impacts their 
development efforts are having. That said, the more introspective policy 
formulation process to which Lyonchhen referred above106 has been 
gradually rendered obsolete. Gone is the subjective, replaced by the 
objective. Gone are the days where an inspirational speech would suffice to 
hold bureaucrats accountable to Bhutan’s development philosophy. Today, 
Excel spreadsheets and quantifiable metrics supplement those speeches, and 
sometimes threaten to overshadow them.107 
Bhutan’s embrace of quantifiable metrics has turned into a national 
preoccupation for Bhutan’s civil servants. Bhutan’s government employees 
are used to a routine of periodic planning retreats, endless lists of 
performance indicators, and target setting. These rituals mesh seamlessly 
with the preferences of Bhutan’s international development partners, who 
require objective and quantifiable documentation of the impact of their 
 
104.  Id. 
105.  See URA ET AL., supra note 10. See also Emma Bryce, The Flawed Era of GDP is Finally 
Coming to an End, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/countries-gdp-gross-
national-happiness [https://perma.cc/QM7S-UZY9]. 
106.  Supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
107.  See Dorji Dradhul, What Makes One NOT a Civil Servant?—A Personal Perspective, 
KUENSEL (May 25, 2019), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190525115239/http:/www.kuenselonline.com/what-makes-one-not-a-
civil-servant1-a-personal-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/L6D5-LBCF]. 
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contributions to Bhutan’s development in order to justify their continued 
presence in the country. The preoccupation with metrics, however, also 
leaves behind those who are not trained in such measurement exercises. In 
particular, it cedes the conversation about progress to civil servants, and 
away from elders or less-formally educated citizens. 
The merits of this quantification revolution aside, its impact on 
Bhutan’s TDRPs has been staggering. As described below, Bhutan’s 
informal dispute resolution sector was initially shielded from the purview 
of Bhutan’s development planners. By the early 2000s, however, efforts to 
strengthen the rule of law settled on the need to reinforce alternative dispute 
resolution capacities at the local level. Once the gaze of the planners affixed 
to dispute resolution practitioners, the same bias towards quantifiable 
outcomes informed those efforts. The various subjective aspects of what 
makes DCM so appealing, and so appropriate, in Bhutanese villages is 
difficult to quantify. Instead, development planners focused on more 
measurable aspects such as the number of trainings conducted, the 
percentage of officials trained, and the percentage civil disputes resolved by 
mediators at the local level.108 While these metrics may reflect notions of 
“progress” in a quantifiable sense, they certainly reflect nothing of the 
subjective values and norms described above. For example, one of the 
virtues associated with DCM was the focus on improving and reworking the 
relationships between the disputing parties. This focus is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to capture in terms of any quantifiable metric 
one could imagine. 
 
B. Reforms to Bhutan’s Formal Justice System Since 1959 
 
The relative stasis of Bhutan’s dispute resolution landscape, which 
remained largely unchanged since the announcement of Zhabdrung’s death 
in 1708, began to abruptly change in the late 1950s.  At that time, Bhutan’s 
Third King introduced significant legal reforms. Most notably, K3 oversaw 
the drafting of Bhutan’s first modern code of laws, which—for the first time 
in centuries—harmonized a set of rules and laws to govern core elements of 
 
















the country.109 To help interpret and enforce this new code, K3 also created 
an independent judiciary. From that point forward, the judges who 
adjudicated matters in these courthouses were designated as the official and 
learned “guardians” of justice in Bhutan.110  
In the early years of the judiciary’s existence, Bhutan’s judges were 
drawn from the ranks of well-known TDRPs.111 Initially, therefore, there 
was a good deal of continuity between DCM and the natural inclinations of 
Bhutan’s judges (with the key difference, of course, that judges were bound 
to enforce the newly established legal code, as opposed to unwritten 
community norms). Over time, however, Bhutan began to send promising 
students abroad for formal legal training, after which they returned to enter 
the judiciary (as well as other legal institutions in the executive branch).112 
With time, therefore, the education of judges shifted away from the informal 
tutelage-based model that defined the educational formation of TDRPs, and 
towards the formal education dispensed at modern law schools around the 
world. Moreover, most of those judges were educated in common law 
jurisdictions, primarily in India or the United States, where they would be 
trained in a model of adversarial legalism113 that—as many readers will no 
doubt recognize—might be situated at the opposite end of a spectrum from 
the values and tactics implicit in DCM.  
Since 1959, the formal institutions of the justice sector in Bhutan have 
seen an extraordinary period of growth. Bhutan’s judiciary is today 
composed of roughly sixty-three judges.114 This equates to roughly 8.6 
judges per 100,000 residents.115 This ratio places Bhutan towards the higher 
end of the range of how many judges per capita hear cases in other nations, 
for example 10.4 in the United States, 6.6 in England & Wales, 6.5 in 
 
109.  See Whitecross, Thrimzhung Chenmo, supra note 4, at 357. 
110.  Id. at 358. 
111.  See LNA FINAL REPORT, supra note 3 at 25. 
112.  Id.; see also Simoni, supra note 4, at 40. 
113.  See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). 
114.  BHUTAN NAT’L LEGAL INST., supra note 13.  
115.  The 2017 Census, the most recent at the time of publication, found that Bhutan had a total 
population of 735,553, of which 681,720 were Bhutanese citizens (the difference consisting of migrant 
laborers, tourists who happened to be in Bhutan during the national census, and persons residing in 
Bhutan who lack legal paperwork) See NAT’L STATISTICS BUREAU, 2017 POPULATION & HOUSING 
CENSUS OF BHUTAN 10, 18 (2018), http://www.nsb.gov.bt/publication/files/PHCB2017_national.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4AFE-SCKT]. 
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Canada, 2.7 in South Korea, 2.3 in Japan, 1.6 in Malaysia and 1.0 in India.116 
Given Bhutan’s challenging terrain and relatively poor infrastructure, such 
a comparatively high ratio of judges per capita can be justified in terms of 
access to justice, since even today many Bhutanese communities remain 
many hours removed from the nearest courthouse. Bhutan’s judiciary is 
organized into a four- or five-tiered system (depending on location),117 with 
a total of thirty-five courts of primary jurisdiction spread across Bhutan and 
two courts of appeal (the High Court and the Supreme Court) located in 
Thimphu.118 Supreme Court decisions are subject to one final, and 
discretionary, review by His Majesty.119 In 2018, Bhutan’s court system 
handled a total of 1,232 criminal cases and 7,310 civil cases.120 While many 
in Bhutan spoke to us about their worry that Bhutan’s population was 
becoming increasingly litigious, this figure still compares quite favorably to 
other countries, where the ratios of civil cases per capita can be significantly 
higher.121 
 
116.  ERIK G. JENSEN & THOMAS C. HELLER, BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL 
APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 99 (2003). 
117.  Administratively, Bhutan is split into twenty dzongkhags (districts). Some dzongkhags—
especially those encompassing regions with population centers located far away from the dzongkhag’s 
administrative center—also have sub-district administrative centers called dungkhags. Dzongkhags and 
dungkhags are further subdivided into a nationwide total of 205 gewogs (counties), which are themselves 
subdivided into a nationwide total of 1044 chiwogs (village clusters). See ELECTION COMM’N OF 
BHUTAN, NAMES OF VILLAGES UNDER 1044 CHIWOGS, 
https://www.ecb.bt/namesofDemkhongs/NamesOfVillagesUnder1044Chiwogs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WZC9-FSHJ]. Each dungkhag and each dzongkhag has a court of primary jurisdiction, 
but decisions by a dungkhag court are appealable first at the dzongkhag level. All dzongkhag decisions 
are appealable to the High Court in Thimphu, which used to be the court of appeal for the entire judiciary. 
Since 2008, a Supreme Court, which is also located in Thimphu, serves as an additional layer of appeal 
on top of the High Court (which itself contains a full-bench appeals process for initial High Court 
decisions). All sentencing decisions by the Supreme Court are ultimately subject to the discretionary 
review of His Majesty Himself if petitioned by one of the parties. See Structure of the Royal Court of 
Justice, ROYAL CT. JUST. BHUTAN, 
http://www.judiciary.gov.bt/index.php/Welcome/get_pages?id=22%20&cat=5 [https://perma.cc/GJ3Y-
4MJH]; Whitecross, Thrimzhung Chenmo, supra note 4, at 361 (describing the court structure and 
hierarchy before Bhutan’s transition to democracy). 
118.  Structure of the Royal Court of Justice, supra note 117. 
119.  Prior to the establishment of Bhutan’s Supreme Court in 2008, the High Court’s decisions 
were appealable directly to His Majesty. 
120.  JUDICIARY OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2018 8 (2018), 
www.judiciary.gov.bt/publication/ar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVF2-DZ46]. 
121.  Bhutan’s 2018 statistics suggest approximately 994 cases per 100,000 population. In 
Australia, this figure is approximately fifty percent higher at 1542 civil cases per 100,000, and in the 
United States it stands at almost six times the rate of Bhutan, at 5,806 civil cases per 100,000. See J. 













The court infrastructure also grew at a rapid clip during this time. In the 
1980s, courthouses were still modest affairs, packed into one or two spare 
rooms of the dzongkhag administrative offices.122 Court clerks had no desks, 
and all court communications were written by hand.123 During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the government began to invest in the judiciary’s physical 
infrastructure. 124 Much of this had to do with upgrading the iconography 
surrounding the courtrooms themselves.125 The judge was given a throne to 
sit on, usually placed on an elevated podium at the front of the courtroom 
(to signify that the judge is acting in the name and image of His Majesty the 
King). Defendants and plaintiffs were given special seats and desks at the 
front of the room, and three traditional Buddhist masks, signifying the 
defense attorney, the prosecutor, and the truth-diviner were installed at the 
front of the room to give the hearings additional gravitas.126 After Bhutan’s 
transition to democracy, the judiciary embarked on a major capacity-
building scheme to give each courthouse a separate physical building, 
visibly separating the judiciary from the executive branch of government.127 
This evolution of the judiciary today is visible to the naked eye. In most 
administrative capitals of Bhutan, today two prominent civic buildings 
dominate the municipal architecture: the first usually the ancient dzong—a 
citadel-style fortress housing Bhutan’s executive apparatus and its central 
monastic authorities, and the second, usually facing towards the dzong from 
a hilltop of similar height and prominence—the district’s new courthouse. 
Since 1959, Bhutan’s body of laws has also grown exponentially. 
Whereas in 1959 lawyers needed to be familiar only with the Thrimzhung 
Chenmo, by 2019 the number of separate laws had grown to an estimated 
108.128 Those various acts are supplemented by countless agency 
 
Law, Econ., & Bus Discussion Paper No. 681, 2010), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S9EX-VBSV]. 
122.  Interview with Sonam Gayal, in Nganglang, Pema Gatshel Dzongkhag (Dec. 12, 2019). 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id.; see also Whitecross, Of Texts and Drama, supra note 4, at 94 (writing in 2016 that “[i]t 
is not clear when these items appeared in the courtrooms, however based on interviews, they appear to 
be very recent additions”). 
125.  See also LUNGTEN DUBGYUR, PARASOL, supra note 4. 
126.  See also Whitecross, Of Texts and Drama, supra note 4, at 94. 
127.  See AUSTRIAN DEV. COOPERATION, supra note 108. 
128.  The Office of the Attorney General lists 104 separate acts, and the National Council website 
lists 108. Some of these acts are substantively redundant, and thus some of the older acts may no longer 
be valid law. See Acts, OFF. ATT’Y GEN., https://www.oag.gov.bt/language/en/resources/acts-2/) 
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regulations and implementing directives, which usually go into much 
greater detail than the acts, and also constitute important sources of law, 
especially procedural and administrative law. The proliferation of new laws 
was especially remarkable during the 1990s and 2000s, when a staggering 
eighty acts were first adopted or amended (as compared to a total of fourteen 
new acts adopted during the previous three decades).129  
 
1. The “Shadow of the Law” on Bhutan’s Traditional  
Dispute Resolution Practices 
 
The birth and rapid growth of Bhutan’s formal judiciary, and the 
explosive proliferation of new laws starting in the 1990s, have profoundly 
changed the way people access and relate to traditional dispute resolution in 
Bhutan. 
 
a. The Replacement of TDRPs With a New Class of  
Specially Anointed Justice Professionals 
 
The judiciary—and in particular its judges (drongpoens)—have slowly 
replaced the elders of the past as the ultimate authorities on distinguishing 
right from wrong.130 Judges today are widely lauded as highly educated and 
authoritative individuals. In recent years, they have almost all been educated 
abroad, in foreign languages, and are sometimes more able to express legal 
concepts in English than they are in Dzongkha or other Bhutanese spoken 
languages.131 His Majesty personally inducts the judges into the judiciary 
by means of an elaborate palace ceremony to grant them a green scarf—a 
Bhutanese symbol placing them at co-equal status with other high-level 
government officials such as parliamentarians or cabinet ministers.132 They 
are addressed in the honorific. Their court judgments make the national 
 
[https://perma.cc/5CT8-2FLX]; Acts, NAT’L COUNCIL BHUTAN, 
https://www.nationalcouncil.bt/en/business/acts [https://perma.cc/UGR5-DC7T]. 
129.  These figures are based on my personal research and are only as good as the various acts I 
was able to locate. This is almost certainly an underestimate of the true figure. Simoni and Whitecross 
describe this proliferation of laws as an “orgy of statute making.” Simoni & Whitecross, supra note 4, 
at 176. 
130.  LNA FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 25, 92-100. 
131.  See also Simoni, supra note 4. 













news, and constitute an important source of learning about the nature of 
right and wrong in the country. Furthermore, judges routinely see it as part 
of their mandate to travel to rural communities to educate people about the 
laws. This role is supplemented by the judicial training institute133 which is 
located in Bhutan’s capital and conducts numerous nationwide legal 
awareness initiatives that are then disseminated via television, radio, print 
and in-person presentations or workshops. The judiciary’s elaborate 
symbolism, ritual and outreach power contrasts starkly with that of the 
TDRPs, whose only source of power is their gradually-accumulated 
reputations for honesty and integrity within their respective communities.  
 
b. The Introduction of a New “Justice Language” 
 
As in most countries of the world that subscribe to modern notions of 
the “rule of law,” Bhutan’s judicial decisions are articulated in terms of 
rights, based on the laws of the land. These justice narratives contrast starkly 
with the TDRPs’ language of personal responsibilities towards others and 
Buddhist ethics. As a result, there has been a profound shift in terms of how 
disputes are commonly discussed in Bhutan: away from a narrative of 
mutual interdependence and responsibilities, and towards a narrative of 
entitlements and rights. At an intellectual level, this trend has proven to be 
profoundly disorienting for a great majority of the TDRPs we spoke to—so 
much so that many have simply given up trying to combat this new and 
overwhelming narrative with their older responsibilities-based notions of 
justice. 
This rhetorical shift from responsibilities to rights is counterbalanced, 
to a limited extent, by Bhutan’s 2008 Constitution. The fairly standard set 
of civil and political rights enumerated in Article 7 of Bhutan’s Constitution 
are followed by a separate article enumerating fundamental duties that every 
Bhutanese citizen or person residing in Bhutan also has towards his or her 
neighbors and nation.134 But while the Constitution arguably embraces both 
a narrative of individual rights and civic duties and responsibilities, the 
nature of the duties enumerated in Bhutan’s Constitution is very different in 
nature from the responsibilities embraced by Bhutan’s TDRPs. Some 
 
133.  The Bhutan National Legal Institute (BNLI).  
134.  CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN art. 7 (“Fundamental Rights”); Id. art. 8 
(“Fundamental Duties”). 
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contemporary constitutional duties are more reminiscent of the kind of state-
law that the elders of the past were required to refer to the higher 
authorities.135 Other constitutionally mandated fundamental duties are no 
more than logical extensions of municipal law. For example, a human right 
against violations of one’s civil rights cannot be real unless there exists a 
corresponding duty on the part of every citizen—enforced by criminal 
law—to “not tolerate or participate in acts of injury, torture or killing of 
another person, terrorism, abuse of women, children or any other person.”136 
Such fundamental duties are little more than legal tautologies, and 
violations of them would inevitably be framed in terms of criminal law, not 
personal responsibilities or duties.137  
Only three of the duties enumerated in Bhutan’s constitution are 
arguably echoes of a Buddhist sense of personal responsibility: the “duty to 
preserve, protect and respect the environment, culture and heritage of the 
nation”138; the duty to “foster tolerance, mutual respect and spirit of 
brotherhood amongst all the people of Bhutan transcending religious, 
linguistic, regional or sectional diversities”139; and the “responsibility to 
provide help, to the greatest possible extent, to victims of accidents and in 
times of natural calamity.”140 Nonetheless, it remains entirely unclear how 
the judiciary would act on any alleged violations of such a fundamental duty 
without resorting to some form of criminal-law-based language. The 
constitutional duty to provide help to a victim of an accident, for example, 
 
135.  See, e.g., id. art. 8, § 1 (to “preserve, protect and defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
security and unity of Bhutan”); id. art. 8, § 4 (to “respect the National Flag and the National Anthem”); 
id. art. 8, § 8 (to “pay taxes in accordance with the law”). Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel’s eighteenth-
century law code also included such citizen duties—primarily limited to paying one’s taxes and 
contributing labor in furtherance of national development priorities—but listed those duties separately 
from the various individual responsibilities that applied to all individuals, regardless of their post in life. 
See WINDISCHGRAETZ & WANGDI, supra note 4. 
136.  CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN art. 8, § 5; see also TOBGYE, supra note 4, at 
91. 
137.  For more on this topic, see Liora Lazarus, Benjamin Goold, Rajendra Desai & Qudsi Rashee, 
The Relationship Between Rights and Responsibilities, MINISTRY JUST. RES. SER. 18/09 (2009) (U.K.); 
Hans Küng, Global Ethic and Human Responsibilities, Address at Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, 
Santa Clara Univ. Submitted High-level Expert Group Meeting: Human Rights and Human 
Responsibilities in the Age of Terrorism (Apr. 1-2, 2005); Fernando Berdion Del Valle & Kathryn 
Sikkink, (Re)discovering Duties: Individual Responsibilities in the Age of Rights, 26 MINN. J. INT’L L. 
189 (2017). 
138.  CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN art. 8, § 2. 
139.  Id. art. 8, § 3. 













would presumably also be adjudicated in a court of law based on whether 
the alleged defendant’s actions satisfied the elements of an enumerated 
crime in the Penal Code, not in terms of whether that person owed a 
constitutional duty towards the victim of the accident. Thus, even the 
Bhutanese Constitution’s balanced embrace of both rights and 
responsibilities has not yet translated into a similarly balanced embrace of 
both concepts by Bhutan’s modern-day judiciary. 
Compounding this trend has been the gradual, if perhaps popularly 
misunderstood, embrace of human rights language by policymakers in 
Bhutan. The upper echelons of Bhutan’s justice sector certainly understand 
that human rights protections pertain primarily to the relationship between 
the individual and the state, as a legal framework to prevent individuals and 
communities from arbitrary or unjust incursions by the state on their natural 
rights.141 But the idea of an individual or community directly contesting the 
legitimate exercise of state power still sits uncomfortably with other 
powerful Bhutanese narratives describing the proper relationship between 
an individual and the state. Those alternative conceptualizations emphasize 
the need for citizens to demonstrate unwavering humility and respect 
towards the government and its representatives.142 As a result, the narrative 
of human rights has only rarely been invoked by domestic activists to 
contest the exercise of state authority.143 On those extremely rare occasions 
when it has, it typically provoked counter-accusations of poor form, lack of 
patriotism, or worse. 
In my personal experience, the language of human rights has instead 
been deployed more frequently to describe instances when a supposedly 
uncompromising—and culturally novel—attitude towards certain social 
issues is imposed at the expense of traditional attitudes. Common examples 
are changing attitudes about domestic violence, child abuse, and corporal 
punishment. Rather than being understood as a framework to describe the 
 
141.  Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-rights [https://perma.cc/9FBA-XYGF]. 
142.  See Whitecross, Virtuous Beings, supra note 4, at 71-82; see also Karma Phuntsho, Echoes 
of Ancient Ethos: Reflections on Some Popular Bhutanese Social Themes, in THE SPIDER AND THE 
PIGLET: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON BHUTAN STUDIES 564 (Karma Ura 
&and Sonam Kinga eds., 2004). 
143.  The most noteworthy example here is the rebellion in the 1980s by Lhotshampa residents in 
Bhutan’s southern regions protesting against national dress requirements. See PHUNTSHO, supra note 
34, at 578-82. 
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nature of the relationship between the individual and the state, or even the 
responsibility of the state to ensure that certain rights are upheld, popular 
perceptions are that human rights apply primarily in the context of 
relationships between private individuals, such as the relationships between 
a husband and a wife, a parent and a child, or a school teacher and a pupil. 
Moreover, the perception is that human rights are absolute and 
uncompromising, in contrast to more flexible Bhutanese traditions. This 
perception feeds the notion that human rights are a mandatory pre-condition 
for Bhutan’s continued development and modernity. Many of the TDRPs 
we spoke to expressed some reservations about the incursion of human-
rights style thinking in their communities, but dismissed their concerns as 
simply not being aligned with their communities’ changing expectations of 
justice. 
Their concern is sad but well-founded: alongside the lofty rhetoric 
extolling the virtues of Bhutan’s informal dispute resolution traditions, 
many Bhutanese policymakers and their international development partners 
demonstrate significant disdain for Bhutan’s TDRPs. In casual 
conversation, one frequently hears apologetic references to the 
“backwards,” “antiquated,” and “superstitious” practices of “uneducated” 
elders resolving disputes in Bhutanese communities. Many in Bhutan’s 
judicial elite are quick to dismiss the continued role of the elders as an echo 
of the country’s past, soon to be phased out with the passing of the elders’ 
generation. Such commentators apply contemporary human rights standards 
to dismiss historical descriptions of dispute resolution stories, complain of 
lacking checks and balances in the dispute resolution systems of old, and of 
lacking accountability mechanisms to censure elders if they are biased. 
Judging from our numerous conversations with both the consumers and 
suppliers of traditional dispute resolution services, many of these assertions 
rely on unfounded generalizations, stereotypes, or outlier examples about 
traditional dispute resolution practices in rural communities.  
For example, one frequently hears among gender-rights activists that 
while traditional dispute resolution may be appropriate for some types of 
disputes, TDRPs cannot be trusted to adjudicate family disputes where 
traditional gender norms may be at issue.144 In fact, as our research has 
 
144.  Of frequent concern in such ruminations are situations involving domestic violence, or 













demonstrated, practitioners of DCM in Bhutan go to great lengths to honor 
the dignity of the individual disputants, including those who belong to 
sexual, religious, or ethnic minorities. 
 
c. Increasingly Accessible Appeals Processes 
 
From its beginnings, Bhutan’s formal justice system was always 
considered as a supplement of last resort to the primary dispute resolution 
processes in Bhutan. As described below, over time certain types of disputes 
were removed from the scope of what TDRPs were allowed to handle. But 
even for those cases that remained legitimately within the mandate of 
Bhutan’s elders, the courts increasingly came to serve as a viable appeals 
process to those informal dispute resolution processes. In effect, Bhutan’s 
entire informal dispute resolution infrastructure—the TDRPs as well as the 
LG officials145—essentially became a prerequisite point of entry into 
Bhutan’s formal justice system. Individuals dissatisfied with the outcome 
of a dispute resolution process at the village level could easily appeal that 
decision in court. Furthermore, as a result of the significant improvement of 
Bhutan’s infrastructure, as well as the persistent efforts to make the courts 
more customer-friendly,146 the physical and psychological barriers 
associated with going to court have also dramatically reduced. 
Parties who today choose to appeal the outcome of an informal dispute 
resolution process essentially enjoy a proverbial “second bite at the apple” 
to resolve their dispute. For reasons having to do with differing evidentiary 
standards, different normative traditions, and a de facto respect for mediator 
privilege, judges in Bhutan usually entertain such appeals de novo, 
evaluating all the evidence anew. Other than asking parties in a binary sense 
whether they have already attempted to resolve the case informally (and, if 
they haven’t, encouraging them to consider doing so), judges typically 
refrain from inquiring into the details of previous dispute resolution efforts. 
Over time, this has gradually undermined the seriousness with which parties 
engage in informal dispute resolution processes. It is as though parties come 
to an elder even while simultaneously trying to guess at their likelihood of 
 
145.  See infra Section III.C. 
146.  See Lungten Dubgyur, Review of Judicial Reforms in Bhutan, in THE SPIDER AND THE 
PIGLET: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON BHUTAN STUDIES 379 (Karma Ura 
& Sonam Kinga eds., 2004). 
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success in court. Many elders we spoke to complained of how the promotion 
of a guaranteed and easily accessible judicial “BATNA”147 distracted the 
parties from genuinely applying themselves to the challenge of finding an 
informal resolution to the dispute. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, the judicial alternative is one that tempts parties with the 
chimera of complete and glorious vindication—a formal verdict in one’s 
favor, as opposed to the more nuanced outcomes of an informal dispute 
resolution processes. As many elders shared with us, their efforts to sell 
disputants on the promise of relationship-preserving DCM are gradually 
losing ground to the more seductive promise of full and cost-free 
vindication by a court of law.  
 
d. The Shrinking Legal Mandate for Bhutan’s Traditional  
Dispute Resolution Practitioners to Act 
 
The Trimzhung Chenmo designated only the most serious of crimes as 
ineligible for informal dispute resolution processes.148 This situation 
changed in 2001 with the passage of Bhutan’s Civil and Criminal Procedure 
Code, which stipulates that “[a]t any stage of the proceedings, it shall be 
open to the parties to take the help of a . . . mediator[] for mutual settlement 
of a civil case . . .”149 According to all accounts gathered by our research, 
Bhutan’s law enforcement and judicial authorities consider the prohibition 
on mediators handling criminal cases to apply only to serious criminal cases. 
As we heard repeatedly, elders are still free to handle less serious types of 
crimes, for example “if no one is bleeding,” or if the theft included only 
“small items.”150 But these standards are clearly highly subjective, and 
rarely delineated in the formal law.151 This situation creates a grey zone of 
legal uncertainty for defendants accused of a large number of so-called 
 
147.  One’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement. See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & 
BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES 102 (Penguin Books 3d ed. 2011) (1981). At the risk of being too cute 
with acronyms, one might call it a BATMA (best alternative to a mediated agreement). 
148.  Whitecross, Thrimzhung Chenmo, supra note 4, at 364 (citing sections Da 3-1 and 3-2 of the 
Thrimzhung Chenmo). 
149.  Civil and Criminal Procedure Code of Bhutan, 2001, art. 150 (emphasis added). 
150.  These words, or words very similar to them, were told to us countless times during 
interviews with authorities across Bhutan.  
151.  The only exception I was able to identify is Domestic Violence Prevention Act of Bhutan, 
art. 22, which states that certain types of non-felonious domestic violence, allegedly perpetrated by non-













minor criminal offenses, opening the door for serious potential abuse of 
power and legal confusion.  
Bhutan’s proliferation of new laws also led to a multiplication of 
different types of crimes. Each new act, it seems, delineates new types of 
crimes, usually flowing from the willful disregard by an offending party of 
the provisions in the act. This gradual expansion of potentially criminal acts 
is compounded by a lack of any tangible tort law doctrine in Bhutan 
delineating competing civil law delicts that may arise from the same 
potentially criminal act. To the extent that there exists overlapping criminal 
and tort liability, the courts understand the tort law remedy to serve merely 
as a supplemental form of punishment, compensating the victim of that act 
over and above any criminal sanctions that the state may impose on the 
alleged perpetrator.152 Thus, the legitimate space for elders to mediate keeps 
shrinking over time.  
Furthermore, changing societal standards, or changing official 
priorities, can today quickly alter the unwritten standards governing the 
division of labor between Bhutan’s formal and informal dispute resolution 
systems. Such changes can have serious consequences for any TDRPs slow 
to learn of these changed standards. A poignant example concerns underage 
marriage in Bhutan. Traditionally, Bhutanese villagers married young, often 
before attaining the modern age of majority, eighteen years of age. As a 
result of international scrutiny and legislation passed subsequent to 
Bhutan’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
1990,153 the authorities suddenly took a keen interest on preventing any 
underage marriages from taking place. Just months before, authorities might 
have turned a blind eye towards “close” cases—for example a nineteen-
year-old man marrying a seventeen-year-old girl from the same village. 
 
152.  Based on personal conversations with judges in Thimphu and elsewhere. In one such 
example, a judge described to us the extraordinary lengths he had to go to in order to compel the 
compensation of the victim of an accident (a dart that ricocheted off a target and instead hit a child in 
the eye, thus blinding that child), since the police were not willing to charge the person who had thrown 
the dart with a crime, citing no intent to harm the child. Without a police charge sheet and a subsequent 
criminal case to rule on, the judge had no clear basis for ordering remedies of any sort, criminal or civil. 
By contrast, a TDRP in the same community found no difficulty justifying an order to compensate the 
child, citing a principle of traditional justice that “the law is in favor of the person who loses something,” 
and that the issue of whether the person who threw the dart did so intentionally or on accident was 
immaterial, since the child obviously lost something and deserved the protection of the law.  
153.  See Child Care and Protection Act of Bhutan 2011; Marriage Amendment Act of Bhutan 
2009. 
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What used to be considered a “minor” criminal incident—informally still 
eligible for quiet resolution by an elder—suddenly had become a “serious” 
criminal case, absolutely inappropriate for informal dispute resolution of 
any kind. But while there may have been universal knowledge of this 
official shift in relevant legal standards at the elite level, the TDRPs in the 
villages were the last ones to receive this information. More troublingly, 
when they finally did learn about the change in priorities, it usually came in 
the form of a harsh official rebuke by a government official, or worse yet a 
criminal prosecution for illegally mediating a case.154 Rumors of severe 
sanctions against TDRPs spread like wildfire across Bhutan, and reinforced 
the impression of TDRPs as outdated, uneducated, and potentially human-
rights-violating dinosaurs. Predictably, this had a serious chilling effect on 
TDRPs. Many told us they are thoroughly confused by what constitutes a 
civil case—and thus safe for them to handle—and that as a result they have 
simply stopped accepting any cases for potential mediation. 
 
C. Reforms to Bhutan’s Informal Dispute Resolution System Since 2002 
 
In 2002, an amendment to the law delineating local government 
mandates and procedures, which had originally been passed in 1991, 
introduced language conferring on Bhutan’s LG leaders a mandate to 
“mediate and conciliate disputes of minor civil nature referred by the people 
in the ge[w]og by involving, if required, conciliators of good standing in the 
community.”155 This amendment coincided with an administrative reform 
expanding the authority to mediate local disputes from the chimis156 to 
include also the gups (elected sub-district LG officials).157 By 2009, the 
initial language encouraging LG officials to consider involving TDRPs (or 
the chimis) had disappeared,158 thereby enabling them to resolve disputes on 
their own initiative. That said, the 2009 reforms did not go so far as to confer 
 
154.  For example, a mediator can be fined and imprisoned for “execut[ing] a written agreement 
or mak[ing] an oral settlement in contravention of the provisions laid down in [the Act]." Marriage Act 
of Bhutan, 1980, Kha 8-16. 
155.  Geog Yargay Tshogchhung Chathrim Act 2002, art. 11, § 15.  
156.  Chimis in the past were tasked with representing the gewog at the national level.  
157.  Interview with Kinley Wangchuk, in Buli village, Zhemgang Dzongkhag, Bhutan (Dec. 18, 
2019). 
158.  The text of Local Government Act of Bhutan, 2009, which replaced the Geog Yargay 
Tshogchhung Chathrim Act, reads in Section 84(i) that the “Gup as the Chairperson and head of the 













upon LG officials the exclusive mandate to provide dispute resolution 
services in their communities; their mandate was still intended to run in 
parallel to the continued role of the TDRPs.  
Initially, these reforms would have had little impact on informal dispute 
resolution in most Bhutanese villages. The selection of local government 
representatives was the first manifestation of democracy in Bhutan.159 
During K3’s reign, the idea that decisionmakers should be selected by virtue 
of a bottom-up election first took hold. This selection process typically 
involved one representative from each household in a constituency, who 
jointly decided—usually by consensus—who should represent the 
community. Individuals usually did not campaign to be selected; instead, 
they were nominated based on their reputation in the community for 
objectivity and fairness. Unsurprisingly, those nominated to serve in local 
government were usually also the same who were already entrusted by their 
communities to act as TDRPs. Conferring upon those same individuals an 
explicit mandate to resolve disputes therefore had little if any practical 
impact on what they were already doing, in most cases.  
That changed due to another key clause in the laws regulating local 
governments. The same 2002 amendment to the law regulating LGs in 
Bhutan also stated that a candidate running for an LG position “shall be 
functionally literate.”160 The 2008 Election Act further defined this 
“functionally literate” standard as being “capable of reading and writing in 
Dzongkha.”161 Especially in those areas of Bhutan where Dzongkha is not 
the primary spoken language, this requirement significantly limited who 
could stand for an LG election.162 Even in areas of Bhutan where Dzongkha 
was the principal language of communication, many traditional elders did 
not meet the standard because they did not know fluently how to read or 
write. With time, these requirements changed the demographics of those 
who served in LG positions; away from the traditional village elders and 
towards younger, more upwardly mobile, and more formally educated 
political aspirants.  
 
159.  PHUNTSHO, supra note 34, at 566-72. 
160.  Geog Yargay Tshogchhung Chathrim Act, art. 4, § 7. 
161.  Election Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2008, Annexure § (u). 
162.  Further limiting who could stand for an LG election, a 2007 amendment to the LG Act 
stipulated that candidates must be between twenty-five and sixty-five years old. See Local Government 
Act of Bhutan 2007, § 35(c). 
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These new leaders brought with them different norms about how to 
resolve disputes. In pursuit of their mandate to resolve disputes in the 
community, they relied heavily on the same attributes that qualified them to 
run for local office in the first place. Being formally educated, they relied 
on their ability to read and apply Bhutan’s formal laws, prioritizing that 
skillset over their more limited fluency with the spiritual or religious ethics 
that had guided their predecessors. Although not without exception, many 
modern LG officials interpret their dispute resolution function as similar to 
that of a judge: namely to investigate disputes, distinguish fact from fiction, 
and render a verdict. When asked to explain the value of their role, almost 
all emphasize their superior ability to decide cases efficiently and in line 
with the law. It is for this reason that their style of mediation is most 
accurately described as “administrative adjudication”163—a far cry from the 
DCM practiced by the TDRPs of the past.  
In 2012, the Bhutan National Legal Institute (BNLI)—Bhutan’s judicial 
training institute—began a major initiative to train all LG officials164 in a 
standardized model of dispute resolution that it dubbed the Thuenlam 
(translated literally as “unity of the people, neighborliness and harmonious 
living”165) model of mediation. The initiative enjoys the high-level support 
and financial backing of the Royal Government of Bhutan,166 as well as the 
generous financial backing of Bhutan’s international development 
partners.167 It also attracted the technical support of foreign mediation 
 
163.  Serge Loode likens the practice of LG-administered mediation in Bhutan to the Australian 
process of “conciliation,” which he defines as a process that “allows the conciliator to provide 
information on relevant legislation, and to make suggestions for appropriate solutions to the conflict.” 
Just like in Bhutan, conciliators in Australia are often government officials, and “often have special legal 
or other training, and are operating under specific laws, which outline the kinds of matters that fall under 
their jurisdiction.” Serge Loode, Development of Mediation in Australia and Bhutan: The Future 
Perspective, 4 BHUTAN L. REV. 25, 28 (2015). I go further than Loode in describing it as a form of 
adjudication, since many of the LG leaders we interviewed went well beyond merely “making 
suggestions” on how best to resolve a conflict, and in fact rendered their judgments, just as would be the 
case in a formal court of law. 
164.  LG officials trained included gups (gewog headman), mangmis (deputy gewog headmen) 
and tshogpas (chiwog headmen).  
165.  See Lungten Dubgyur, A Contextual Legal Application of a Jabmi, 8 BHUTAN L. REV. 53, 
54 (2018). 
166.  JUDICIARY OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 45 (2017).  
167.  AUSTRIAN DEV. COOPERATION, supra note 108 (allocating a total of €3 million to the justice 
sector for a range of activities, including BNLI’s efforts to revive ADR systems in Bhutan); see also 













experts with a particular interest in comparative mediation systems168 and 
prominent scholars from among Bhutan’s judicial community. Although I 
am in no position to comment on the rigor of the preliminary research that 
informed the justification for BNLI’s LG training initiative,169 in 2013 the 
GNHC concluded in its request for funding that “only few people use 
[alternative] dispute resolution” in Bhutan, and that “it is [sic] therefore 
become very important to revitalize ADR system in our society.”170 
BNLI describes its work promoting administrative adjudication at the 
LG level as a continuation and revival of Bhutan’s centuries-old dispute 
resolution traditions. In practice, however, the style of dispute resolution is 
quite different from DCM. During their training workshops, LG officials 
listen to a variety of lectures describing the basics of mediation, with an 
emphasis on the financial and efficiency advantages of mediation over the 
formal judicial process.171 They are given a simple mediation process 
template172 to use, which essentially holds that the mediator should speak to 
the parties separately before holding any joint mediation sessions.173 They 
are also given limited opportunities to practice their mediation skills in the 
context of simulated mediation skits.174 Crucially, they are given a briefing 
on the limits of their mediation mandate, complete with a rapid-fire primer 
on some of the laws they will likely encounter as mediators.  
Thanks to the persistent messaging efforts of BNLI, judicial authorities, 
and the LG officials themselves, administrative adjudication is now what 
most people think of when they hear the terms “Nangkha Nangdrik,” 
“mediation,” “dispute resolution,” or “conciliation” in Bhutanese villages. 
Armed with their certificates of attendance at BNLI’s mediation training, 
which lasts anywhere from three days to a full week, many LG officials we 
 
http://www.mohca.gov.bt/download/11th_FYP.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WS4-AQXL]; MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DEN., 30 YEARS OF BHUTANESE-DANISH PARTNERSHIP 4 (2014). 
168.  See Loode, supra note 163; Melinda Edwards, Promoting and Strengthening the Practice of 
Mediation in Bhutan (Bhutan Nat’l Legal Inst. Research Paper, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
169.  See Yargay, supra note 4. 
170.  See GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS COMM’N, supra note 167, at 427. 
171.  Bhutan Natl’ Legal Inst., Mediation Curricula (on file with author). 
172.  See Edwards, supra note 168, at 43; Yargay & Chedup, supra note 4, at 99-100. 
173.  See Yargay & Chedup, supra note 4.  
174.  See generally id. 
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interviewed claimed that only those certified175 by BNLI were authorized to 
practice as mediators in local communities.176 Whether intentional or 
unintentional, BNLI’s efforts to train LG officials have effectively 
cemented the role of LG officials as Bhutan’s newest—and increasingly 
also its exclusive—providers of dispute resolution services in rural 
communities.177 As the current director of BNLI wrote in 2015, BNLI’s 
initiative is indeed responsible for a “significant judicial reform”178 in 
Bhutan in terms of how disputes are handled in rural Bhutanese 
communities, all without any legislative intent to effectuate such a dramatic 
overhaul of Bhutan’s dispute resolution landscape.  
LG mediators are typically very efficient, often settling a case within 
hours. They provide their dispute resolution services for free, as part of their 
regular duties as LG officials. In all dzongkhags, disputes are first handled 
at the chiwog by a tshogpha (village headman). If they are unable to resolve 
the case, it is next brought to the mangmi, and, failing resolution there, to 
the gup. In some dzongkhags we visited—especially those in the west—
gewogs had further appeals procedures in place, for example bringing the 
case to a panel of gewog officials to resolve. In Paro, for example, a case 
could be elevated first to the gewog, and subsequently to a panel of gups 
from across the dzongkhag for review.179 All of these processes, taken 
together, are still all appealable to the formal justice system.180 
 
175.  BNLI’s training does not “certify” anyone as a “licensed” mediator—it merely issues any 
attendees with certificates of attendance.  
176.  In fact, the LG officials are intended to provide their services not instead of, but alongside 
to the TDRPs.  See Yargay & Chedup, supra note 4, at 110-11. 
177.  Merry describes this trend as a predictable tendency by government officials when faced 
with “competitor(s) in the marketplace of disputes.” Merry, supra note 97, at 2069. 
178.  Yargay, supra note 4, at 17. 
179.  Interviews with Gewog and Dzongkhag Officials (Mar. 2019). 
180.  In recent years, three other initiatives have been introduced into the informal dispute 
resolution landscape. The impact—if there is any—of these new programs on Bhutanese TDRPs cannot 
yet be documented as they are all still very new. In 2016, RENEW, a civil society organization dedicated 
to the elimination of domestic violence in Bhutan, began an innovative program to train its community-
based volunteers on consensus building, drawing explicitly on victim-offender mediation models for 
certain types of less-serious incidents of domestic violence. See Passang Dorji, RENEW & Police Meet 
for “Consensus Building Training”, BHUTAN BROADCASTING SERV. (May 22, 2018), 
http://www.bbs.bt/news/?p=96202 [https://perma.cc/JLW6-EZP5]; see also PHUMZILE NGUKA-
MLAMBO ET AL., UNITED NATIONS HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON JUSTICE FOR WOMEN, JUSTICE FOR 
WOMEN: HIGH-LEVEL GROUP REPORT 59 (2019), 
https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/Justice-for-Women_Full-Report-English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HV7G-BSRK]; Stephan Sonnenberg, What Relevance for ADR in Situations of 













D. Out with the Old, In with the New 
 
These various reform initiatives, all of which took place in the name of 
capacity building and an improvement of judicial services, effectively drove 
to extinction the dispute resolution practices that had been practiced for 
centuries in Bhutanese villages and communities. Bhutan’s elders have been 
told, both explicitly and implicitly, that their methods are no longer relevant 
in today’s Bhutan. In some cases, they have even been told that they are no 
longer legally allowed to practice as mediators at all. In most communities 
we visited, this has effectively shut down the traditional practice of dispute 
resolution. The LG officials who took their place, in turn, have served as 
catalysts for the further spread of rights-based understandings of right and 
wrong, at the expense of the TDRPs’ old responsibilities-centric approach. 
  
1. Benefits of Bhutan’s Modernizing Informal 
Dispute Resolution Processes 
 
The evolution of informal dispute resolution practices in Bhutan has led 
to a number of concrete benefits for communities in Bhutan. BNLI 
commonly mentions that its interventions have made dispute resolution 
services more accessible, especially from a financial perspective; more 
efficient; and less prone to influence by the wealthier or more literate 
individuals in a community.  
 
Certain Types of Domestic Violence, HARV. NEGOT. & MEDIATION CLINICAL PROGRAM (Nov. 21, 
2018), http://hnmcp.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/blog/what-relevance-for-adr-in-situations-of-domestic-
violence-part-2-the-design-and-challenges-of-bhutans-consensus-building-initiative-for-certain-types-
of-domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/SLC5-PNSX]. In full disclosure, I worked extensively on this 
effort while working as a clinician at JSW Law. In 2019, the judiciary also launched a new initiative to 
train senior judicial clerks as court-annexed mediators, who would thenceforth provide mediation 
services directly in courthouses across the country. Yargay & Chedup, supra note 4; see also Rinzin 
Wangchuk, All Courts to Have Mediation Unit—KuenselOnline South Asians News Portal (Oct. 30, 
2019),  https://southasiansnews.com/2019/10/30/all-courts-to-have-mediation-unit-kuenselonline/ 
[https://perma.cc/DM76-93AP]. That same year, efforts also began in earnest to design the mandate for 
Bhutan’s new Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre (ADRC), the creation of which is called for by 
Bhutan’s 2013 ADR Act. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of Bhutan, 2013. The ADRC’s 
mandate is likely to focus primarily on commercial arbitration, although it was also exploring other ways 
to provide ADR services. While none of these new initiatives are necessarily a bad thing, and each are 
responding to a clear need for ADR innovation, it is also true that Bhutan's informal dispute resolution 
landscape is getting increasingly congested. 
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In the past, TDRPs181 were sometimes compensated for their services 
with small gifts of appreciation such as rice, vegetables, local alcohol (ara), 
or butter. In addition, it was expected that the parties requesting the services 
of the TDRPs might provide them with lunch or refreshments. Usually, 
these gifts or remunerations were thought of as a customary thank-you for 
the elder’s services. None of the elders we interviewed ever suggested that 
these “payments” were required for them to provide their services, but many 
told us that they were considered customary. Many also told us that if ever 
they suspected that one of the parties was financially weak, they would 
reject any such payments. With time, however, such non-mandatory 
customs may easily have begun to resemble de facto requirements, 
especially in the eyes of disputants who might consider their fates to be 
dependent on the good will of the mediator. Furthermore, as the economies 
of villages became more cash-based, some elders might also genuinely have 
begun to think of their services not in terms of earned karmic merit, but 
rather in terms of opportunity costs and lost salaries. Many we spoke to 
suggested that such informal payments may even have become a source of 
potential bias for some mediators, in that wealthier disputants could have 
afforded to “out-gift” the other side and thereby ensure more favorable 
treatment by the elders mediating their case. Because of the passage of time, 
it is impossible to verify whether such allegations are based on actual 
historical fact or merely the more modern lore justifying the need to reform 
the system, or perhaps a bit of both. According to many whom we 
interviewed, these various payments, however modest they may have been, 
did constitute a hurdle to some parties accessing the services of TDRPs, 
especially the most socioeconomically vulnerable in society.  
The new system, which relies not on elders but rather on elected LG 
leaders, is often described as being equally accessible to all segments of 
Bhutanese society, regardless of their socioeconomic means. LG leaders 
receive a government salary for their services and accepting payments of 
any sort from villagers seeking their services is illegal.182 Of course, LG 
 
181.  As well as other types of third-party dispute intervenors not covered in this paper. See supra 
note 86. 
182.  Local Government of Bhutan Act 2009, § 181(h) (“A member of the Local Government 
shall not … [a]ccept [a] bribe, including any fee, gift, and compensation or reward in the discharge of 













officials can (and sometimes do183) still knowingly flaunt the anti-corruption 
provisions in their mandate. However, in such cases a powerful system of 
administrative anti-corruption mechanisms exists to curb abuse.184 
Consequently, the less well-off in society have arguably benefitted the most 
from the expansion of the LG’s dispute resolution mandate. 
The second argument commonly heard in favor of the LGs’ 
administrative adjudication processes is that they are quite a bit more 
efficient than their alternatives. This is certainly true with respect to the 
formal court processes, but also, presumably, with regard to Bhutan’s 
traditional model of dispute resolution (DCM). As described above, the 
TDRPs were usually not particularly concerned with time-efficient 
resolution of the conflicts brought before them; instead, they sought 
sustainable outcomes that promised a qualitative improvement in the 
disputants’ relationships towards one another. LG officials, on the other 
hand, often boasted how they might sometimes resolve mediations within 
hours. Many of the parties, especially those who might be more conflict-
averse, are drawn to this promise of greater efficiency. 
Finally, LG officials often state that their mediation efforts are less 
prone to the distorting bias of powerful or wealthy individuals in the 
community bending the process in their favor. While potentially true, our 
research did not uncover any evidence for this assertion. Quite the contrary, 
many consumers of the LGs’ dispute resolution services complained to us 
of precisely such bias among LG officials, usually in favor of those who are 
more well-off, more powerful, or perhaps more similar to the LG officials 
in terms of their upbringing or educational background. Indeed, many 
individuals who insisted on taking their cases to court did so precisely 
because they felt the judicial authorities would be less biased against them 
than their local LG leaders. 
 
183.  See e.g., Staff Reporter, Panbang Court Sentences Goshing Gup and Three Others in 
Corruption Case, KUENSEL (Dec. 5, 2019), https://kuenselonline.com/panbang-court-sentences-
goshing-gup-and-three-others-in-corruption-case/ [https://perma.cc/6CS9-VHVB]; Kinley Wangchuk 
& Samdrup Jongkhar, Gups in SJ Accused of Misusing Fund, BHUTAN BROADCASTING SERV. (May 1, 
2019), http://www.bbs.bt/news/?p=113687 [https://perma.cc/RC9G-L3PA]; Rinzin Wangchuk, ACC 
Implicates 11 for Fraud, Encroachment of Govt. Land, KUENSEL (June 19, 2016), 
https://kuenselonline.com/acc-implicates-11-for-fraud-encroachment-of-govt-land/ 
[https://perma.cc/QPY8-VNJK]. 
184.  See Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on Bhutan: An Anti-Corruption Movement Like No 
Other, FCPA BLOG (July 21, 2017), https://fcpablog.com/2017/07/21/andy-spalding-on-bhutan-an-anti-
corruption-movement-like-no/ [https://perma.cc/7C7X-ADJY]. 
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Depending on one’s perspective, the administrative adjudication model 
also promises two additional benefits. First, since BNLI’s LG training 
emphasizes key aspects of Bhutanese law, the modern system promises 
greater substantive consistency between what an LG official and what a 
judge might decide. Without significant additional investment in the legal 
capacity of the LG officials, however, this promise is still highly 
aspirational. A few hours of training is hardly enough to give LG leaders, 
most of whom have never had any other formal legal training, the 
background they would need to competently adjudicate cases. Thus, while 
the Nankha Nangdrik training may give LG officials the confidence to 
believe they can competently adjudicate cases in line with the law, this 
confidence is premature. Certainly, our research team has uncovered 
numerous instances where LG officials had roundly misinterpreted relevant 
legal standards.  
The LG officials themselves were often the first to acknowledge this 
problem. Many of them asked us to convey to the judiciary the need for 
more trainings, focusing in greater depth on the details of the laws. The 
problem, of course, is that these LG officials were essentially asking for a 
formal legal education, so that they could begin to adjudicate cases with the 
same level of substantive sophistication as a judge. This persistent request 
also reveals the degree to which LG officials fail to differentiate their 
administrative adjudication process from a formal legal adjudication. If the 
end goal is merely to decide cases consistently with the laws, any benefits 
associated with the qualitative aspects of a mediation process consequently 
fall by the wayside.  
Finally, a standardized national model of LG-administered dispute 
resolution holds the promise of greater transparency and accountability. By 
2018, each of the 205 gewogs administrations had been trained on the 
Thuenlam model of dispute resolution, and subsequently encouraged to 
share annual data about the number of cases mediated in each location. After 
gathering a first round of data, BNLI found that a total of 4,492 cases had 
been mediated.185 In all likelihood, this figure still significantly 
undercounted the true number of disputes being mediated by LG officials 
across Bhutan, since the tshogpas at the village cluster level—who usually 
handle the greatest number of disputes—do not uniformly keep track of the 
 













number and type of cases they resolve.186 Nonetheless, it shows the 
magnitude of the LGs’ dispute resolution capacity, and gives a more 
rounded picture of the overall number of disputes arising in Bhutanese 
communities.  
 
2. Drawbacks of Bhutan’s Modernizing Informal  
Dispute Resolution Processes 
 
In many of the villages we visited, the gradual expansion of the LG 
officials’ mediation mandate at the expense of all other types of informal 
dispute resolution has led to a growing societal dependency on LG officials 
for their dispute resolution services. Whereas in the past, individuals could 
seek out the services of a range of TDRPs, today, individuals in many 
communities are encouraged to bring virtually all of their disputes—
regardless of their magnitude—to LG officials for resolution. Not only does 
this centralization of the dispute resolution mandate pose a tremendous 
burden for the LG officials themselves—who, in addition to resolving 
disputes must also handle all administrative and local development-related 
affairs in the locality—but it also shrinks the choice for disputants of where 
to mediate their disputes to only one institution.  
First, in today’s Bhutanese villages, the role of an LG official formally 
combines legislative, executive, and now quasi-judicial functions into one. 
With growing efforts to decentralize government decisionmaking to the 
local level,187 LG officials set important development priorities at the local 
level. At the same time, Bhutan’s Constitution also requires that gups 
remain “apolitical.”188 Any enemies they may have made in those capacities 
are unlikely to view them as potentially impartial dispute resolvers in the 
context of a dispute. And yet if, for whatever reason, a disputant lacks 
confidence in their LG official, or finds them to be biased or politically 
 
186.  See id. at 4. This is also consistent with the findings of the LNA. 
187.  GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS COMM’N, supra note 14, at 81-82. 
188.  CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN, art. 22, § 17; see also Nima Dorji, The 
Politics of Apoliticality: In the Conflict between Political Rights and Political Neutrality, Facelessness 
Wins (Bhutan Law Network at JSW Law Research Paper Series No. 18-4 (2018)), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266270. But see UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM BHUTAN & PARLIAMENT 
OF THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN, BHUTAN NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: TEN YEARS OF 
DEMOCRACY IN BHUTAN (2019) (concluding as one of its findings that “[p]eople are reluctant to discuss 
politics openly or share their views to avoid being accused of belonging to a particular party,” and 
recommending that the ECB clarify what is meant by “apolitical,” also with regard to LG officials). 
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compromised in some way, they are often left with only the prospect of 
addressing themselves to the formal justice system, where they are likely to 
face renewed pressure to first exhaust all LG mediation options before 
proceeding with a formal complaint.  
Second, the mediated outcomes of LG administrative adjudications tend 
to be a lot less creative than their TDRP precursors. As described above, LG 
officials seek to adhere closely to the provisions of the law, and thus rarely 
come up with truly “out of the box” thinking that often characterized DCM. 
At best, LG officials encourage parties to agree to compromise and agree to 
what they describe as “win-win” outcomes. In reality, this is typically just 
another way of saying that those who are owed something should agree to 
accept a lesser amount than what they are entitled to under the law, so that 
the outcome might be described as a win for both sides. In my personal 
opinion, this has led to a lamentable loss of the beautiful Solomonic wisdom 
that was on display in many of the stories told by the elders we interviewed 
handling those same types of cases in the past. 
Finally, the cumulative societal role of the dispute resolution process 
overall has become more transactional. Whereas, in the past, disputes were 
seen as an opportunity to improve community relationships, disputes today 
are seen only as prompts for quick and effective action within the constraints 
of that single dispute only. While the modern dispute resolution process may 
be efficient, it is also much less effective in keeping villages harmonious 
than the DCM.  
 
3. Balancing the Ledger 
 
The reforms to Bhutan’s traditional justice mechanisms have had a 
profound impact on how rural Bhutanese villages resolve their disputes. The 
final verdict as to whether these various changes have been for the better or 
for the worse rests firmly in the eyes of the beholder. My assessment, which 
stems from our field research, is that the perspectives of the civil servants, 
their counterparts working in international organizations, and the small 
cadre of outside technical advisors who are hired as consultants to support 
Bhutan’s development process have won out over the views of the rural 
communities. Many of the purported benefits of the reforms pertain largely 













the drawbacks described above come at the expense of the rural consumers 
of Bhutan’s dispute resolution processes.  
Historically speaking, no one at the local level had concerns about the 
accessibility of dispute resolution processes. The elders in the past were 
always accessible, and barriers to access those services, while real, were 
quite modest. This was reinforced by the strong karmic—not financial—
incentive that many elders we interviewed told us motivated their efforts. 
Similarly, the argument that LG administrative adjudications are more 
efficient does not correspond with reality. While villagers in the past 
generally avoided formal court proceedings whenever possible, 
complaining not just of excessive time spent going to court but also of harsh 
methods and procedures that they did not understand, the LG administrative 
adjudication processes did not, as it is commonly claimed, replace those 
formal court proceedings. If anything, the tightening standards of what 
constitutes a case eligible for mediation is increasing the caseload in 
Bhutan’s courts, while the courts themselves have undertaken a number of 
reforms to make them more efficient and customer-friendly. Rather, as 
described above, the LG dispute resolution processes are merely 
supplanting the TDRP-administered processes (especially DCM), which 
were never premised on a need for efficiency. 
Similarly, the concern with transparency and accountability—i.e., the 
promise of being able to better keep track of how many and what kinds of 
cases are mediated—is only a concern for those who are tasked with 
assembling nationwide statistics or administering a standardized national 
accountability process. The preoccupation with data and accountability was 
never a problem at the local level. There, the reputations of the individual 
dispute resolvers served brilliantly as the ultimate accountability metric. 
The problem, therefore, was not that there were no accountability 
safeguards in place, but rather that the civil servants in Thimphu did not 
understand or control those safeguards. Today’s centralized system of 
dispute resolution is arguably equally or more prone to corruption, apathy 
or politicization than was its decentralized precursor, with the only 
difference that today the civil servants have taken over from the villagers 
the means for curbing those vices. 
Finally, the promise that today’s modern dispute resolution system 
might generate outcomes more strictly in line with the law is also a concern 
that was never held at the local level. Villagers expected their TDRPs to 
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help them reestablish harmony at the village level. Adherence to the laws 
was only ever seen as a means to that ultimate end, insofar as those laws are 
also formulated in light of a societal vision of communal harmony. Thus, 
whether through DCM, or LG-administrative adjudication, or a formal 
judicial proceeding, the ultimate litmus test for most Bhutanese 
communities of the success or failure of a dispute resolution process was 
always its ability to re-establish community harmony. 
In contrast, some of the drawbacks of Bhutan’s modern dispute 
resolution weigh disproportionately on the concerns that villagers might 
have. The loss of creativity described above may be a loss to the villagers, 
even while it may come as a relief to the civil servants who no longer have 
to field complaints about a lack of consistency and the occasional quirky 
mediated outcome.189  Such creativity, which was the hallmark of traditional 
village-based dispute resolution, is lost in modern dispute resolution 
processes. 
Furthermore, the changed demographics of who can serve as a local 
leader have also inured to the overall benefit of Bhutan’s civil servant class, 
at the expense of the local communities. Bhutan’s modern-day LG officials 
typically completed some level of formal education and are more familiar 
with the administrative language used by the civil service. As a result, it 
might be easier today for civil servants in Thimphu to find common 
professional ground with their modern LG counterparts than it was in the 
past. But those same LG officials may also have a harder time connecting 
with their village constituents, most of whom do not have that same type of 
educational background. 
Finally, the modernization of Bhutan’s dispute resolution landscape has 
stripped the country’s elder generations of an important traditional role in 
their communities. In the past, elders might pride themselves on their 
 
189.  As an illustration of this point I refer to the case of a nonviolent but psychologically abusive 
husband in the Haa valley, who had fallen out of love with his wife but was still the family’s sole 
breadwinner. The woman was unwilling to seek a divorce, since doing so would leave her and her 
children destitute. Moreover, she claimed, the abuse was only sporadic, because the husband spent the 
majority of the year herding the family’s yaks in the highland pastures, leaving her and her children in 
peace. The TDRP who mediated the case ultimately agreed that a shack should be built on the family’s 
property where the husband could live alone during the few winter months when he was back from the 
highlands. Finances continued to be shared, and everyone, including the neighbors, felt this to be a 
wonderful outcome. Nonetheless, those same elders were also visibly embarrassed to share this example 
for fear that it might not be in line with modern laws, or with the dictates of human rights as they 













important role helping to resolve community disputes. Today, in contrast, 
many complain of feeling redundant and useless. This has also led to an 
erosion of respect for elder generations in the communities.  
 
IV. A FINAL NOTE ON THE ROLE OF THE DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
 
In response to above analysis, some might argue that the processes of 
modernization are impossible to reverse. According to this logic, while 
perhaps lamentable at a sentimental level—especially by outsiders who tend 
to accept romantic notions of how life was simpler in the past without 
having to themselves live those lives stripped of modern conveniences—
modernity is not something that communities should resist, but rather 
something they should learn to embrace and benefit from. In Bhutan, this 
argument is less common than in many developing countries.190 Instead, 
most still seem to genuinely embrace the importance of preserving culture, 
even if that sometimes comes at the expense of breakneck modernization. 
From that perspective, if the way individuals and communities handle their 
disputes can be deemed an integral part of their culture, it is important to 
pinpoint exactly the locus of the push to modernize. If the reforms are the 
result of a bottom-up process demanding such reforms, one might argue that 
change might be necessary, even at the expense of cultural preservation. But 
if instead, as I argue above, they are the result of a top-down process of 
modernization driven largely by the interests of civil servants and their 
partners in the international development community, an ethical dimension 
arises that I address in the final part of this paper. In particular, I would like 
to raise the issue of needing to think carefully not just about the interests of 
the civil servants and international development partners, but also the needs 
and concerns of the communities that stand to be directly impacted by rule-
of-law development reforms. 
Over my several years in Bhutan, I have been an astonished observer of 
an incessant push to reform and restructure Bhutan’s justice sector. This 
instinct is especially noteworthy in light of Bhutan’s remarkable track 
record managing its own affairs without outside intervention or support. 
Most of the seminal reform efforts that have been so influential in reshaping 
 
190.  See e.g., LWAZI SIYABONGA LUSHABA, DEVELOPMENT AS MODERNITY, MODERNITY AS 
DEVELOPMENT (2006) (discussing the application of the idea of “development as modernity” on the 
African continent). 
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how justice is done in Bhutan were initiated prior to the presence in Bhutan 
of any outside development partners. Bhutan has inspired the world with its 
home-grown model of development. And Bhutan can—and should again—
inspire the world all over again with its successful establishment of the rule 
of law in the twentieth century. As described above, before the Wangchuck 
dynasty was established in 1907, Bhutan was arguably a nasty and brutish 
place. Today, it is known internationally as the world’s last “Shangri-La.”191 
This transition did not come about by accident, but notably was the result 
of carefully thought-through reforms initiated by Bhutan’s early Monarchs. 
If one listens to some of Bhutan’s international development partners—
a euphemism for its donors—however, one might easily miss that important 
observation. The Austrian Development Agency (ADA), for example, is 
well known for insisting that its capacity-building efforts in Bhutan should 
be known as “reform” projects, not capacity-strengthening initiatives.192 In 
other words, out with the old, in with the new. More to the point, out with 
the Bhutanese models of justice that have evolved over the centuries, and in 
with the Western models more familiar to the donor class and those who 
were educated abroad. This push for change, even if such changes are not 
being called for at the local level, is all the more troubling because they fuel 
a constantly churning cycle of resource-intensive reform proposals that 
define the relationship between Bhutan’s civil servants and their 
international cooperation partners. 
So, what is more appropriate in Bhutan today: wholesale reform and 
replacement of existing justice sector institutions, or capacity-building 
efforts designed to strengthen Bhutan’s home-grown institutions? At a 
theoretical level, of course, the most intellectually sound way to determine 
whether Bhutan’s efforts to improve the quality of its justice sector would 
be to first carefully study the issue from all sides, taking into consideration 
a range of different stakeholder perspectives. Again, from this theoretical 
perspective, the most important of those stakeholder perspectives might 
arguably be those of the individuals and communities who need to access 
 
191.  See e.g,. Why is Bhutan Called the Last Shangri La?, RS TRAVELS BLOG (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.rstravels.co.in/blog/why-is-bhutan-called-the-last-shangri-la-2/ [https://perma.cc/F8X3-
FK3X]; Daniel Scheffler, Bhutan, the Last Shangri La, WONDERLUST, 
https://wonderlusttravel.com/bhutan-last-shangri-la/ [https://perma.cc/64XT-6USX] (two 
representative examples among countless others describing Bhutan as a modern-day Shangri La, a 
narrative primarily oriented towards tourists).  













the various justice institutions. That theoretically logical process, however, 
is unfortunately not how Bhutan’s contemporary justice sector development 
planning process currently unfolds. Instead, the planning process typically 
happens among the policy-planning elites, and often amplifies only those 
voices calling for resource-intensive reform, not those voices comfortable 
with the status quo. 
Bhutan’s planning cycle typically begins with a nationwide planning 
process whereby the GNHC consults a range of stakeholders at all layers of 
governance about potential development projects they might have that 
would require government resources. Every five years, this process 
culminates in a massive five-year development plan (FYP). In preparation 
for the Twelfth Five Year Plan, for example, once finalized, vetted, and 
approved, the many stakeholders who were originally consulted in the 
process were again asked to realign their actual development programming 
in light of that finalized and approved FYP.193 If a development priority is 
not reflected in the FYP, it will not receive funding. If a given sector is 
deemed to be working well, it will typically not be flagged for a budget 
increase. And most importantly for purposes of this discussion, if the 
members of an institution are not included in the government’s consultation 
process in the first place—for example the hundreds of Bhutanese elders 
providing their services informally as community dispute resolvers—that 
institution’s development priorities will simply not be reflected in the 
centralized planning process.  
Once the development plan is in place, the next challenge is to fund the 
various elements in the plan. Some elements of the plan are funded from a 
national budget, or from untied donor funding, which is of course a fairly 
straightforward process. Other aspects of the plan, however, are offered up 
to the international development partners with a particular interest in certain 
substantive areas. The ADA, for example, has expressed a particular interest 
in funding development initiatives focusing on Bhutan’s justice sector.194 
 
193.  See GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS COMM’N, 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN GUIDELINES (2017), 
https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Finalized-Guideline.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UJ7E-TG49].  
194.  In addition to the ADA, the Swiss Development Cooperation and Danish International 
Development Agency also funded justice sector initiatives in the past. The United Nations Development 
Program, which coordinates international development efforts in Bhutan, also provides technical and 
logistical support, but is itself funded in large part by ADA. See Justice for All: Austria and UNDP Join 
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Technically, those international development partners agree to contribute to 
certain parts of the FYP without amending the overall integrity and 
coherence of that plan. In reality, though, a second—and much more 
subtle—negotiation often takes place to gently reframe and massage certain 
programming choices to correspond with the development partners’ 
programming priorities.  
This process is not typically driven by bad faith. It is necessitated by the 
fact that the international donors must themselves also justify their 
continued presence in Bhutan.195 While many international aid agencies and 
foundations may be funding important work in Bhutan on its own merits, 
most of them are also global in scope, and must therefore also justify their 
Bhutan programming vis-à-vis competing development opportunities in 
other parts of the world. Especially in light of a world and a region which is 
sadly replete with natural and man-made disasters screaming for attention, 
justifying a development programming presence in Bhutan can sometimes 
make for a tough sell. By almost any development indicator, Bhutan is a 
glowing success story. Its environment is pristine, its economy growing, its 
people at peace with one another, and its institutions stable. Moreover, these 
achievements are largely due to Bhutan’s home-grown policymaking 
efforts, thereby invalidating even the argument that a continued 
international development presence could serve as a bulwark to prevent 
chaos from setting in. 
As a result, many international aid agencies have gently wound down 
or completely terminated their field presence in Bhutan. Those that remain 
must go to greater and greater lengths to justify their continued presence in 
Bhutan. To do so, they need to demonstrate that their funding portfolio 
includes robust projects designed to address certain global hot-button issues 
of the day, including gender empowerment, structural reform, protection of 
vulnerable populations, etc.196 These hot-button issues are almost never 
 
Hands to Ensure Equal Justice for the Vulnerable, AUSTRIAN DEV. AGENCY, 
https://www.entwicklung.at/en/ada/news/detail-en/justice-for-all [https://perma.cc/72C2-BFG5]. 
195.  See e.g., Tancrède Voituriez, Julie Vaillé & Noura Bakkour, What Rationales for 
International Development Aid? Main Donors’ Objectives and Implications for France (Institut du 
Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales, Working Paper No. 01/17, 2017), 
https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/import/publications/wp0117_apd-narratives_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6HQH-V7SQ] (identifying five different narratives used by different development 
agencies to justify their aid). 
196.  These assertions are strictly my personal opinion, based on my observations and interactions 













generated with regard to any analysis of the actual needs of Bhutanese 
communities. Rather, in the case of bilateral donors, they are the result of a 
process driven by policymakers in the donor country over what kind of 
development projects it wishes to support as part of its global development 
aid mix, or (in the case of multilateral donors or international organizations) 
the result of a global development prioritization process, currently the 
SDGs.197 To receive support, problems must be identified in Bhutan that can 
be deemed to fit within those global funding priorities. 
According to the logic of international development, Bhutan’s 
partnership with the international community requires a constant sequence 
of problem identification, followed by donor-funded problem-resolution 
efforts. The end result must be a conclusive declaration of victory over the 
problem. And, in order to then justify the continued presence of the 
development donors in the country even after that initial problem is 
“solved”—new problems must then again be identified to justify a renewed 
cycle of aid programming. And so on. 
In such a situation, there exists a symbiotic relationship between 
Bhutan’s civil servants, who want to keep their operations well-funded and 
growing, and the international development aid community, which also 
wants to see its offices thrive, and which hopes to claim success for various 
impactful “reform” initiatives that unfolded under its tutelage. From this 
perspective, any act of too generously praising the appropriateness and 
existing capability of Bhutan’s justice institutions, especially those that 
operate without any such outside support, would invite the question of 
whether a continued slate of resource-intensive rule of law “reform” 
initiatives is really necessary, and whether resources might not better be 
spent on other priorities. 
Instead of entertaining such irksome questions, local civil servants and 
their international development partners chose instead to make the case for 
a constant cycle of necessary reform efforts that allows their symbiotic 
relationship to continue unimpeded. All it requires is an unspoken 
agreement to allow existing institutions to be depicted as somehow lacking, 
inadequate, or in need of serious reform, since only such depictions can 
justify the continued flow of resources to support those institutions. Despite 
 
197.  Without wishing to critique the SDGs at all, it is striking how, ever since their promulgation, 
seemingly not a single development activity can go forward without articulating its linkage in a direct 
way to one of the SDGs. 
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the open contempt that many civil servants have of the international 
development partners’ self-serving need to subtly overlook Bhutan’s 
existing institutional capacity, they also recognize the obvious need to 
maintain the façade of open and harmonious development collaboration. 
With an ever-shrinking list of donors willing to support Bhutan’s ongoing 
development priorities, Bhutanese policymakers know that they need to 
play the game. All of this is carefully massaged to still fit within the overall 
framework of Bhutan’s FYPs, so that no one can fault the international 
community for not supporting Bhutan’s national development planning 
priorities.  
If, for whatever reason, no one within Bhutan’s civil service or civil 
society is yet willing to acknowledge that a certain “problem” exists that 
might call for a corresponding development reform initiative, the donor can 
always propose that a neutral study be commissioned to establish whether 
such a problem might exist.198 Such studies are then usually also funded by 
that same international donor, who would usually retain control over 
selecting the consultants to lead it. Tight deadlines are imposed to ensure 
quick progress. Technical experts—who are almost always foreign 
technical experts with a prior track record working on the same substantive 
issue in other countries—are then hired. Next, a “local champion” is 
selected, which is usually some Bhutanese civil service institution with 
substantive jurisdiction over the issue being studied. That local champion is 
given financial support to host, and ultimately co-sponsor, the resulting 
research. The actual research process usually consists of a few days’ 
consultations in the capital, primarily with civil servants, supplemented 
perhaps by a token field visit to generate supposedly grassroots input, or a 
well-financed workshop where the consultants can verify their hypotheses 
about a particular problem with a select crowd of invited stakeholders. Such 
visits are usually formal affairs, tightly choreographed by the sponsoring 
agency to prioritize the perspective of the civil servants who might 
ultimately be responsible for claiming ownership over the final 
recommendations.  
The outcome of such consultancies is almost always a decisive 
conclusion that the originally posited problem is indeed a significant one, 
 
198.  The assertions in this paragraph draw on my personal experience interacting with 













and further that only a major reform effort—ideally spearheaded by the 
Bhutanese agency that co-hosted the consultancy—is likely to solve the 
problem. If, based on that recommendation, a funding request is then 
granted, it will be replete with generous funding to support the TA/DA 
(Travel and Daily allowances) of the various civil servants involved in the 
project, prestigious capacity-building initiatives, as well as ample budget 
lines for more international technical advisors to “guide and support” that 
process in light of international best practices.  
The above description is a composite of the development aid cycle that 
I have witnessed time and time again during my time in Bhutan. Of course, 
it is also an oversimplification and a stereotype. But by and large it can serve 
as a useful description of how the international aid community and their 
civil service counterparts generally agree on development collaborations. 
The cycle is buttressed by noble-sounding language that frames the role of 
the international community as that of a mere “facilitator,” not as the 
substantive driver of new reform initiatives. And yet, in my experience at 
least, the reality is often far more complicated, with international donors 
working hand in hand with their chosen civil service counterparts to drive 
and initiate certain reform initiatives.  
The key point is that this cycle of reform initiatives tends to ignore any 
institutions that are currently working well, and tends to severely 
marginalize any non-elite viewpoints. Furthermore, it tends to 
disincentivize careful consideration of any potential second-order 
impacts—positive or negative—that reform efforts may have on the 
communities they impact. Such perspectives are simply not part of the 
process. The result, unfortunately, is a willful blindness towards well-
functioning local systems, local success efforts, local nuance, or the actual 
frustrations with existing institutions, and a focus instead on grandiose 
projects promising “reform,” “development,” and “progress” in line with 
global hot-button development priorities. 
Unfortunately, the efforts by Bhutan’s civil servant elite and their 
international donor partners to reform how informal dispute resolution is 
done at the village level is one example of how such an approach to 
development planning can cause unfortunate collateral damage in 
Bhutanese communities. This conclusion is sure to cause howls of outrage. 
When confronted with such an argument—which is absolutely not new, I 
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might add199—many development experts take incredulous offense. Go-to 
responses include that “human rights” or “rule of law” standards are 
universal; the product of universal consultation and best practices, and thus 
beyond the purview of legitimate discussion. This is perhaps the preferred 
response, because—by implication—it paints anyone daring to protest (in 
this case me) as an enemy of progress, justice, virtue, and global 
cooperation. Another common retort is that these various reform initiatives 
are driven by Bhutanese stakeholders, with the international community 
merely providing technical and financial expertise. According to this logic, 
it is not the international community that is acting as the violator of national 
sovereignty, but rather the critic (again, me). Still another style of rebuttal 
tends to focus on objective output indicators supposedly demonstrating the 
success of the reform initiatives. Finally, one might respond by accusing 
critiques such as this one of being overly academic, or by suggesting there 
are surely others with greater experience who might disagree with the 
analysis.  
Each of these rebuttals deserves thoughtful discussion, all of which 
would exceed the scope of this article. That said, I would suggest that the 
strongest response may be a proposal not to replace, but rather to strengthen, 
the existing development planning process. Rather than engaging in 
polemics, my suggestion would be to include a robust and honest 
consultation process that includes the perspective of all stakeholders 
impacted by a proposed reform initiative. My hope is that the results of our 
field research can serve as an example of the kind of analysis that might 
help better inform the development planning process.  
None of the above should be interpreted as an allegation of bad faith by 
any of the actors described who currently participate in the development 
planning process. From the elders to the LG officials, to the civil servants, 
policy makers and international donors, each actor in this system is 
responding as best they can to the incentives they face. What this paper 
 
199.  See, e.g., Makau wa Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 
42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201 (2001); Marie-Bénêdicte Dembour, Following the Movement of a Pendulum: 
Between Universalism and Relativism, in CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 56 
(Jane K. Cowan et al eds. 2001); David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of 
the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002); David Rieff, The Precarious Triumph of Human 
Rights, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 8, 1999), at 37; Binyavanga Wainaina, How to Write About Africa, 92 
GRANTA (2005); Ivan Illich, Address to the Conference on InterAmerican Student Project (April 20, 













should instead make clear is the crucial need for all actors in this 
development enterprise to leave space for sophisticated—and I would argue 
qualitative—research to assess the potential impacts of any proposed reform 
initiatives on potentially impacted communities.
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